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RESTRUCTURING MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 
 




What sorts of legal relief should be available to a municipality in 
financial distress? Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code has served as an 
option of last resort for many municipalities over the years. But as this 
Article illustrates, Chapter 9 arguably falls short of an effective solution 
and at times seems to contravene the foundational principles underlying 
bankruptcy law. By examining recent Chapter 9 filings, this Article 
presents a comprehensive analysis of how and why Chapter 9 has failed 
to address the problems that characterize municipal insolvencies. It 
argues that Chapter 9, in both practice and principle, has proved 
unsatisfactory in combating the very issues it was designed to resolve. 
After highlighting Chapter 9’s shortcomings, this Article suggests critical 
areas of reform that will begin to reconcile Chapter 9 with the broader 
goals of bankruptcy law. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In sunny California, a city is struggling. Crime is up, and infrastructure 
improvements are down.1 In 2013, “there were more than two dozen homicides 
compared to just seven in 2006.”2 “Residents are leaving.”3 City officials expect 
pension payments to jump to over 20% of the city’s budget, putting the city into a 
“death spiral.”4 Moody’s Investors Service has concluded that the city “remains 
vulnerable to increasing annual [pension] payments.”5 
                                                 
* © 2016 Laura Napoli Coordes. Associate Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College 
of Law, Arizona State University. J.D., University of Chicago Law School; B.A., New York 
University. I would like to thank Zachary Kramer, Troy Rule, Zachary Gubler, Cathy 
Hwang, Patrick Luff, Kaipo Matsumura, Rhett Larson, Erin Scharff, and Jennifer Johnson 
for their comments and suggestions. 
1 Irma Widjojo, Vallejo Homicide Numbers Highest in Nearly 20 Years, TIMES-
HERALD (Jan. 2, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.timesheraldonline.com/general-
news/20140102/vallejo-homicide-numbers-highest-in-nearly-20-years [http://perma.cc/Y4 
RV-FQQN]. 
2 Bob Adelmann, Vallejo, California, Likely Headed for Second Bankruptcy, NEW AM. 




5 Bankrupt California Cities Face Steep Climb to Solvency Without Pension Relief, 
MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Feb. 20, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
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This city may seem like a prime candidate for municipal bankruptcy under 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. But in fact, this city has already filed for Chapter 
9 and emerged from bankruptcy less than five years ago.6 This city is Vallejo, 
California, and it faces a very real risk of tumbling back into the financial distress 
Chapter 9 was supposed to help alleviate.7 
Over the past few decades, counties, cities, and towns have turned to Chapter 9 
to adjust their debts and to receive a fresh start that enables them to better address 
other issues, such as rising crime or failed infrastructure projects.8 On paper, Chapter 
9 provides distinct advantages to a struggling municipality, including breathing 
room to assess its situation free from the pressures of creditors, the ability to 
renegotiate contracts, and an opportunity to formulate a plan of adjustment to deal 
with debts.9 In practice, however, entities utilizing Chapter 9 face expensive, time-
consuming, and resource-draining battles that often prevent them from achieving the 
very outcomes they seek from bankruptcy.10 
Overwhelming pension shortfalls, poorly structured financing deals, and the 
aftermath of the economic recession are leading more municipalities to consider 
bankruptcy as an option for dealing with financial distress.11 A close look at the 
Chapter 9 cases filed over the last few years indicates, however, that Chapter 9 has 
often been unable to help municipalities achieve the goals they seek from 
bankruptcy, notably, elimination of holdout creditors and reduction of debt 
overhang.12 By focusing on these recent municipal bankruptcy cases, this Article 
draws attention to Chapter 9’s limitations and demonstrates that Chapter 9, as 
currently used, often undermines the very objectives it is designed to help 
municipalities accomplish. 
                                                 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Bankrupt-California-cities-face-steep-climb-
to-solvency-without--PR_293349 [https://perma.cc/Z67P-PMEW].  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993) (noting that 
“municipal bankruptcy is based on the idea of the fresh start”). 
9 See JONES DAY, AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: 




10 Id.  
11 Id. at 3.  
12 Although it is admittedly difficult to find consensus among scholars on the goals of 
municipal bankruptcy, the literature in this area consistently speaks of bankruptcy as a 
mechanism to eliminate holdout creditors and reduce debt overhang, the condition where an 
entity’s debt is so significant that it cannot easily borrow money that would help it get out of 
debt. This literature is described in greater detail in Parts III and IV, infra. 
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This Article provides a thorough analysis of recent municipal bankruptcies to 
assess exactly how and why Chapter 9 is failing our cities and towns.13 Chapter 9 
was modeled off of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and this Article 
demonstrates that Chapter 11’s tools are often an ill fit for the municipalities Chapter 
9 is intended to help. In addition to describing Chapter 9’s practical shortcomings, 
this Article shows that Chapter 9 commonly leads to results that are inconsistent 
with a coherent vision of bankruptcy law. 
Although the academic literature to date has acknowledged many of Chapter 
9’s shortcomings,14 Chapter 9 is still considered by many to be an appropriate, if 
tedious, method of addressing municipal financial distress.15 This Article bolsters 
the arguments against that view16 by providing a critical analysis of Chapter 9’s 
                                                 
13 This Article’s focus is on cities, towns, counties, and other general-purpose entities, 
as distinguished from special-purpose districts and school districts. Although the latter are 
frequently considered to be municipalities that can file for Chapter 9, the unique struggles of 
the general-purpose municipal bankruptcies that have been filed over the past few decades 
are this Article’s primary focus. A full discussion of the differences between special- and 
general-purpose bankruptcies is beyond this Article’s scope; however, Part IV, infra, 
contains recommendations for tailoring Chapter 9 relief more closely so as to distinguish the 
needs of general-purpose and special-purpose entities. 
14 See, e.g., Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts 
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They 
Are Killing Cities like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 813 (2014) (“Even when 
municipal bankruptcy (and debt adjustment) is available, it is not a ‘cure-all,’ especially for 
taxpayers and public workers.”); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and 
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (2012) (“The current 
legal structure for addressing municipal fiscal distress may interfere with, rather than 
advance, the objectives of fiscal federalism . . . .”); Katherine Newby Kishfy, Preserving 
Local Autonomy in the Face of Municipal Financial Crisis: Reconciling Rhode Island’s 
Response to the Central Falls Financial Crisis with the State’s Home Rule Tradition, 16 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 348, 358 (2011) (“Overall, then, Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides 
an incomplete solution to the problem of municipal insolvency.”); McConnell & Picker, 
supra note 8, at 479 (“It may well be . . . that federal municipal bankruptcy law is even more 
fundamentally misconceived than at first appeared . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 298 (2007) (“The availability of bankruptcy-specific 
rights is of heightened importance to the municipal debtor.”); Henry C. Kevane, Deploying 
the “Prepackaged” Plan of Adjustments in Chapter 9, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY 
STRATEGIES 107, 109 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (“Although Chapter 9 rightly remains an 
option of last resort . . . it now seems more probable that municipalities will begin to use 
federal bankruptcy relief as an active tool to re-calibrate revenues, services and expenses.”); 
Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45, 49 (2011) (noting 
that Chapter 9 bankruptcy is becoming an “increasingly viable” and sometimes “attractive” 
option). 
16 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 14, at 283; Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 382 (2010); McConnell 
& Picker, supra note 8, 482–83. 
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modern usage that specifically identifies how and why Chapter 9 harms the specific 
entities it is intended to help. 
Unlike those who believe that Chapter 9 should be discarded, however, this 
Article posits that reform can make Chapter 9 a more effective solution to certain 
municipal problems. Thus, after explaining why Chapter 9 is not working as 
designed, this Article targets several areas for reform. By analyzing Chapter 9 
against the broader backdrop of bankruptcy law, this Article illustrates the need to 
develop a Chapter 9-specific toolkit in order to give municipalities the relief they 
seek. Still, this Article cautions that a one-size-fits-all solution may be impractical 
for addressing the various problems encountered by the wide variety of distressed 
municipalities that rely upon Chapter 9 for relief. Indeed, Chapter 9 is ineffective in 
part because it does not account for most of these variations in problems and entity 
types. Only by acknowledging and understanding the primary shortcomings of 
Chapter 9 can policymakers move forward with clarifying the roles of various actors 
to resolve municipal distress and develop more appropriate avenues of relief. Thus, 
this Article begins to illuminate key areas of reform that will make Chapter 9 more 
effective at resolving the problems it is supposed to address. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides the necessary background 
on Chapter 9’s development and highlights several flaws present in its design. Part 
III then examines one of Chapter 9’s most controversial elements: stringent 
eligibility requirements that force debtors to expend significant time and resources 
just to prove that they belong in bankruptcy. Part IV uses a series of cases to illustrate 
exactly how and why Chapter 9 fails to work. On a structural level, Chapter 9 does 
not provide municipalities with the tools necessary to adjust their debts in any 
meaningful manner, thus rooting them more deeply into their financial problems. 
More broadly, Chapter 9 interferes with the goals underlying the bankruptcy system. 
Using these insights, Part V suggests and evaluates possible alternative avenues for 
relief, concluding that a rigid solution for tackling the problem of municipal financial 
distress likely does not exist. Instead, any solution to the municipal distress problem 
must be flexible enough to account for the various alternative mechanisms states 
already have in place, in addition to states’ and cities’ varying political, fiscal, and 
social climates. This Article concludes by encouraging more research into Chapter 
9 reform while emphasizing that suggestions to bolster Chapter 9’s effectiveness or 
supplementation of Chapter 9 with state and regional relief must begin by realigning 
Chapter 9 practice with basic bankruptcy theory. 
 
II.  CHAPTER 9’S DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN 
 
A careful examination of Chapter 9’s development reveals that it is a body of 
reactionary law, designed to patch up impending crises, but ill-equipped to function 
as a broader solution to a complex and fluid set of problems. This poor fit creates 
unpredictability and instability in the law. To illustrate this concept, Part II focuses 
on one of Chapter 9’s most unique structural elements: the existence of stringent 
eligibility requirements that force debtors already at death’s door to expend 
substantial time and resources justifying their use of Chapter 9. Specifically, section 
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II.A traces Chapter 9’s development and design, and section II.B analyzes some of 
the difficulties that result from the need for municipalities to comply with Chapter 
9’s eligibility requirements. 
 
A.  Development 
 
Chapter 9 began as a response to the Great Depression, a time when thousands 
of municipalities defaulted.17 In 1933, Congress amended what was then the 
Bankruptcy Act to enable cities and towns to adjust debts that were becoming 
overwhelming.18 Although these entities could theoretically have adjusted their 
debts without federal assistance,19 they typically faced a holdout creditor, an entity 
that refused to agree to the adjustment, even though most others were on board. By 
allowing a bankruptcy judge to approve debt adjustments agreed upon by a 
supermajority of creditors (rather than a unanimous vote), Congress alleviated the 
holdout creditor problem.20 
Bankruptcy law is uniquely used to overcome holdout creditor problems 
because contracts cannot be modified on a nonconsensual basis under state law.21 
Instead, only federal law gives entities the power to modify or terminate contracts 
over objections.22 Bankruptcy law also counters the collective action problem that 
results when creditors pursue their individual interests with respect to a distressed 
debtor by providing for a single, collective process for debt resolution.23 Thus, it was 
reasonable for Congress to seek bankruptcy remedies for holdout creditors and 
collective action problems plaguing municipalities. 
                                                 
17 Daniel J. Freyberg, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to Be a 
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency—and What Will States 
Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1997); Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: 
The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 923 (2012) (“Chapter 9 municipal 
bankruptcy in the United States came about partly in response to creditor holdout behavior 
that blocked municipal debt adjustment, as well as a spate of lawsuits against municipal 
officials during the Great Depression.”). 
18 Vincent S.J. Buccola, Who Does Bankruptcy? Mapping Pension Impairment in 
Chapter 9, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 585, 592 (2014). 
19 Indeed, prior to 1934, municipalities did not have federal assistance with debt 
adjustment. KENNETH N. KLEE, A SHORT HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 1 (2012), 
https://cumberland.samford.edu/files/Short%20History%20of%20Municipal%20Bankruptc
y.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP6A-7BEE]. This meant that creditors had only state law rights 
(such as filing a mandamus action), and that municipal debt adjustment was limited by the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Id. 
20 Buccola, supra note 18, at 592–93. 
21 See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 450. 
22 See id. (noting that state law was insufficient to remedy the holdout creditor problem). 
23 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1190 
(2014); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 682 (2012) 
(“[M]ost American bankruptcy scholars have understood bankruptcy as a response to 
collective action problems . . . .”). 
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The Supreme Court, however, was not convinced, and in 1936, the Court 
declared Congress’s amendments an unconstitutional encroachment on state 
sovereignty.24 In Ashton v. Cameron County Water District,25 the Court expressed 
concern that the national government, through the Bankruptcy Act, was 
inappropriately interfering with the obligations of state political subdivisions, in 
contravention of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves undelegated powers to the 
states.26 Specifically, the Court held the federal government could not use the 
Constitution’s bankruptcy clause to impair state powers or to pass any laws 
inconsistent with the idea of state sovereignty.27 The Court noted that the federal 
government was improperly intruding into the state’s internal, commercial affairs 
by interfering with municipalities’ contractual obligations.28 In short, by allowing 
municipalities to take advantage of federal laws to adjust their debts and contracts, 
the amendments, according to the Court, impermissibly invited intrusion of the 
federal government and federal laws into state financial affairs. 
The Court’s ruling in Ashton proved only a minor setback. In 1937, Congress 
revisited the Bankruptcy Act and enacted amendments very similar to those the 
Court had struck down.29 This time, however, the Supreme Court upheld the 
amendments.30 The Court’s somewhat puzzling change of heart may perhaps be 
explained by changes in economic climate31 or in the composition of the Court,32 but 
the revised amendments also provided more limited powers for the bankruptcy court 
in municipal cases, potentially alleviating the Court’s concern about federal 
government intrusion into state affairs.33 Despite its earlier reservations, in United 
States v. Bekins,34 the Court upheld these new amendments and seemed to accept the 
                                                 
24 Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 527 
(1936). 
25 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
26 Id. at 531. 
27 See id. at 530–31. Specifically, the Court expressed concerns that allowing 
municipalities to declare bankruptcy would permit the federal government to interfere with 
states’ and municipalities’ contractual obligations, thus prohibiting them from managing 
their own affairs. Id.  
28 Id. at 528; see Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with Chapter 9 
Eligibility—A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)(1988), 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 628 
(1990). 
29 Lam, supra note 28, at 628. 
30 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938). 
31 See Lam, supra note 28, at 629 (noting that the Court “referr[ed] to the ‘steadily 
deteriorating economy of the early 1930s’” in its decision (citation omitted)). 
32 See Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1003 n.22 (describing the justices who made up the 
Court in both Ashton, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), and Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)). 
33 Jonathan J. Spitz, Federalism, States, and the Power to Regulate Municipal 
Bankruptcies: Who May Be a Debtor Under Section 109(c)?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 621, 623 
(1993) (stating that “Congress was cognizant . . . of the potential constitutional problems that 
existed in the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over an agency or instrumentality of a 
state and was careful to avoid interfering with the powers reserved to the states . . . .”). 
34 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
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idea that the federal bankruptcy system could provide valuable relief for distressed 
municipalities.35 By limiting the powers of the bankruptcy court, Congress 
successfully struck a balance between allowing federal relief and protecting state 
sovereignty. 
Although Congress initially intended these amendments, referred to as Chapter 
IX of the Bankruptcy Act,36 to be a temporary measure to cabin the harms of the 
Great Depression, in 1946, Congress permanently incorporated the amendments into 
the Bankruptcy Act.37 In the 1970s, Congress revised the Bankruptcy Act and sought 
to make it easier for larger cities to file for bankruptcy relief.38 New York City was 
facing serious financial difficulties during this time, and Congress wanted New York 
and other large cities to be able to utilize Chapter IX.39 Thus, Congress expanded 
the types of debt that could be adjusted and expanded the scope of the municipality’s 
powers in bankruptcy to respond to New York’s financial crisis.40 Despite these 
revisions, New York City received a bailout and did not utilize Chapter IX.41 
The next major set of municipal bankruptcy revisions came in the 1980s, after 
the Bankruptcy Code had replaced the Bankruptcy Act, and Chapter IX became 
Chapter 9. During this time, Congress again grew concerned that a financially 
distressed city, this time Cleveland, could not utilize Chapter 9 effectively.42 Thus, 
Congress made adjustments to portions of other Bankruptcy Code chapters that had 
been incorporated into Chapter 9.43 Specifically, Congress added provisions to 
Chapter 9 that gave different treatment to special revenue debt, after concerns arose 
that this debt could be converted into full recourse unsecured debt during 
bankruptcy, creating problems for municipalities like Cleveland that were restricted 
                                                 
35 M. Heith Frost, States As Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific 
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 829 (2015). 
36 At that time, Chapter 9 was called Chapter IX under the Bankruptcy Act’s numbering 
system. 
37 See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 778 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (“In 
1946, Congress made the municipal bankruptcy provisions permanent . . . .”). 
38 Id. at 780 (describing the specific revisions). 
39 Spitz, supra note 33, at 624–25. Specifically, the requirement that 51% (in amount) 
of creditors accept a plan before the bankruptcy petition was filed was impossible for cities 
with large numbers of creditors. Id. at 624. 
40 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2015). 
41 KLEE, supra note 19, at 6–7 (noting that the crisis in New York prompted revisions 
to the Bankruptcy Act and that bankruptcy for New York was averted); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2217, 2241 (2014) (noting that, in New York City, “a bailout avoided the contagion 
effects that bankruptcy might have unleashed”). 
42 Mary Williams Walsh, In Alabama, a County That Fell Off the Financial Cliff, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
02/19/business/jefferson-county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.html?_r=1. 
43 KLEE, supra note 19, at 8. 
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from incurring recourse debt beyond a given threshold.44 These adjustments were 
incorporated into the 1988 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, yet Cleveland 
ultimately also avoided a bankruptcy filing.45 
In the 1990s, yet another city crisis provided the impetus for further 
amendments to Chapter 9. Unlike New York City and Cleveland, the city of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, actually filed for bankruptcy. Yet, the State of Connecticut 
quickly challenged Bridgeport’s authority to file for federal relief.46 This highly 
publicized dispute motivated Congress to clarify the state authorization eligibility 
requirement in 1994.47 To do this, Congress replaced the requirement that 
municipalities receive “general authorization to file” with the more stringent 
requirement of specific state authorization.48 
Under the old general authorization requirement, silence in the law created 
implicit assent to filing, but now, if no state law specifically authorizes 
municipalities to file, a municipality wishing to utilize Chapter 9 must seek authority 
from the state legislature to do so.49 This process was designed in part to strike a 
better balance between federal and state authority, allowing states to have a more 
direct and specific say about when federal bankruptcy laws could be utilized to help 
struggling municipalities.50 
Congress’s enactment of the specific authorization requirements in response to 
the Bridgeport bankruptcy further illustrates one of Chapter 9’s key characteristics: 
its enactment and major revisions were all largely in response to crises. The 
measures Congress took in each version of Chapter 9 were crisis-driven, aimed at 
resolving a specific and pressing problem.51 Yet, the large cities that drove most of 
the major changes to Chapter 9 ultimately never used it, leaving the “improvements” 
                                                 
44 Id. Specifically, lenders who lent money backed by “special revenues” could 
conceivably convert their debt into full recourse unsecured debt in bankruptcy, which could 
create problems for municipalities like Cleveland. Id. 
45 Id. 
46 JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT 
ADJUSTMENT: CHAPTER 9: THE LAST RESORT FOR FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED 
MUNICIPALITIES 10 (2012), http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NV76-TMX2]. 
47 Frost, supra note 35, at 832. 
48 SPIOTTO, supra note 46, at 10. 
49 See George B. South III & Daniel G. Egan, City of Harrisburg Chapter 9 Bankruptcy 
Dismissed, DLA PIPER (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications 
/2012/03/city-of-harrisburg-chapter-9-bankruptcy-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/W2PA-
GSNT]. 
50 H. SLAYTON DABNEY, JR. ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN PERIL: THE ABI GUIDE TO 
CHAPTER 9, at 11–13 (2d ed. 2012). 
51 See Adam Feibelman, American States and Sovereign Debt Restructuring, in WHEN 
STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN 
FISCAL CRISIS 146, 186 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012) (noting that if a crisis 
point is reached, “the question of amending Chapter 9 will be wrapped up in debates about 
how to resolve that crisis”). 
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Congress made untested. Compounding this issue is Chapter 9’s lack of originality.52 
Chapter 9 borrows most of its provisions from other chapters of the Bankruptcy 
Code.53 Its most prominent contributor is Chapter 11, which is designed primarily to 
deal with the restructuring of business entities.54 As explored in more detail below, 
the organization, funding structures, and practical problems of a municipality are 
vastly different from those facing a corporate entity.55 This makes it difficult for 
Chapter 11 rules to address municipal distress.56 
A further difficulty is that Chapter 9 applies one set of rules to a variety of 
entities that are vastly different in structure and function. Although this Article 
focuses on cities, towns, and counties, a municipality could be a hospital, a water 
authority, or a sewer district, to name only a few additional possibilities. Thus, one 
municipal entity type may look vastly different from another in terms of funding, 
structure, and operations.57 Adding a further level of complexity are the many 
disparate types of municipal securities.58 Finally, the underlying causes of municipal 
financial crises are enormously varied.59 Thus, even though hundreds of debtors 
have utilized Chapter 9, the variation in entity type, funding structure, and root 
causes of crises makes much of the case law difficult to apply as precedent.60 
                                                 
52 See generally DABNEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 41–56 (noting that several sections 
of Chapter 9 were borrowed from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 16, at 369–72 (discussing bankruptcy for municipalities); 
see also Lotta Moberg & Richard E. Wagner, Default Without Capital Account: The 
Economics of Municipal Bankruptcy 14 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 30, 31 (2014) (“With 
commercial corporations, there typically exists an active market for shares of ownership and 
there is at any moment a market value for the corporation. In contrast, there is no direct 
market for ownership shares of municipalities, so no market value can be established for 
them.”); Skeel, supra note 41, at 2227–28 (suggesting that municipal bankruptcy is more 
closely akin to bankruptcy for individuals than corporations). 
56 See Andrew L. Turscak, Jr. et al., Settling the Municipal Landscape: How Pre-Plan 
Settlements in Chapter 9 May Sidestep the Traditional Claims-Resolution Process, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., May 2013, at 44, 44 (“[T]he extent to which the Code does and does not 
apply in [C]hapter 9 has been likened to a ‘patchwork’ or a ‘puzzle.’” (quoting In re City of 
Stockton, 486 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013)). 
57 See Skeel, supra note 41, at 2220–21 (contrasting special-purpose entities with major 
cities); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 453 (describing how Congress initially 
believed that counties were “on a different constitutional footing” than municipalities and 
therefore excluded from Chapter 9). 
58 Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal 
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, 
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 688–
89 (2014). 
59 See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 633, 638 (2008) (noting that scholars disagree over the nature and importance 
of factors driving a city’s economic health or decline). 
60 This variation also makes it challenging for Congress to determine how best to amend 
Chapter 9. See generally Nicholas B. Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of 
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Chapter 9’s development as a series of reactionary laws, combined with its 
broad application to a wide variety of entities, has led to an unpredictable legal 
system. This unpredictability erodes confidence in the bankruptcy laws.61  
 
B.  Eligibility Battles 
 
This section explores how the balance Congress struck to preserve state 
sovereignty and allow for federal assistance plays out in one unique aspect of 
Chapter 9: the eligibility battles that municipalities must engage in to gain access to 
federal bankruptcy relief. Due in part to Chapter 9’s unpredictability, filing for 
municipal bankruptcy is seen as a last resort.62 This typically means that any 
municipality seeking Chapter 9 relief is in truly desperate straits. Nevertheless, in 
many cases, when a municipality files a Chapter 9 case, it must embark on an 
arduous journey to prove that it is indeed eligible for bankruptcy relief. This process 
can take anywhere from a few months to several years. The eligibility battles 
chronicled below provide a striking illustration of Chapter 9 creditors’ ability to 
impede access to relief and the costs involved in striking a balance between the 
protection of state sovereignty and the use of federal bankruptcy power.63 First, 
however, some background information on the eligibility requirements is necessary. 
Accordingly, the below discussion explores: (1) the eligibility requirements, (2) the 
extensive eligibility fights, and (3) the harm that results. 
 
1.  Eligibility Requirements 
 
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code lists the requirements for a debtor to be 
eligible for Chapter 9 relief. The municipal debtor must prove that it meets each 
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence.64 In addition, § 921(c) provides 
                                                 
Chapter 9 and a Critique of the “Specifically Authorized” and “Insolvent” Eligibility 
Requirements of 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 517 (2008) 
(discussing the history of municipal bankruptcy, the purpose of Chapter 9, and the lack of 
case law for Congress to review). 
61 See Simon Johnson, The Myth of a Perfect Orderly Liquidation Authority for Big 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (May 16, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2013/05/16/the-myth-of-a-perfect-orderly-liquidation-authority-for-big-banks/?_php= 
true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/H8X7-L924] (“Once 
you establish special treatment and break with precedents, the entire legal process becomes 
murky, unpredictable and likely to spread more fear than confidence in the outcomes.”). The 
article was referring to proposed Chapter 14 special rules for banks, but the same statement 
would apply equally well to Chapter 9. Id. 
62 See, e.g., Kevane, supra note 15, at 109 (noting that “Chapter 9 rightly remains an 
option of last resort”); In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
2009) (“The legislative history indicates that the strict hurdles to filing Chapter 9 were 
implemented to ensure that it was considered by a municipality only as a last resort.”).  
63 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
64 Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
849, 851 (2014). 
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that the bankruptcy judge may dismiss the debtor’s petition if the municipality did 
not file the petition in good faith.65 
 
(a)  The entity must be a “municipality” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code 
 
“Municipality” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “political subdivision or 
public agency or instrumentality of a State.”66 Cities, towns, and counties easily fit 
this definition.67 Other semigovernmental entities, such as a water authority or an 
irrigation district, however, may not.68 These entities must look to bankruptcy case 
law to determine whether they fit within the definition.69 
 
(b)  The entity must be authorized to be a debtor under Chapter 9 by state law 
 
As discussed above, to better protect state control over federal intrusion into 
state commercial affairs, Congress has provided for specific state authorization.70 In 
practice, this means that a state law must exist or be sought specifically granting the 
municipality, “in its capacity as a municipality or by name,” the ability to file for 
Chapter 9.71 
The specific authorization requirement gives states great leeway as to which, if 
any, of their municipal entities may seek federal bankruptcy relief. Although twenty-
seven states allow their municipalities to file for federal bankruptcy, most of these 
states set additional requirements or processes for approval as well.72 Many states 
use some form of “gatekeeper” from whom the municipality must receive approval 
before filing.73 Often, this gatekeeper is a politician or political body. For example, 
municipalities in Connecticut must obtain the prior written consent of the governor 
before filing.74 Thus, even a state that nominally allows its municipalities to file for 
bankruptcy may impose additional requirements, some of which may make the path 
to bankruptcy as much of a political exercise as it is a financial one. The specific 
state authorization requirement effectively creates dual eligibility processes—one at 
                                                 
65 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2012). 
66 Id. § 101(40). 
67 Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in CHAPTER 
9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 173, 183 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (“A political subdivision 
generally includes a county, parish, city, town, village, borough, or township.”).  
68 See, e.g., In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 265–67 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that legislative history is not helpful in determining the scope of a 
“political subdivision, public agency, or instrumentality of a State”). 
69 Patrick Darby et al., Corporate Bankruptcy Panel: Municipal Restructuring, 29 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333, 335–37 (2013). 
70 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
71 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). 
72 Anderson, supra note 23, at 1152.  
73 Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy: The New “New Thing”? Part I, 
BUS. L. TODAY, May 2011, at 1, 2. 
74 DABNEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 31–35. 
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the federal level, and one at the state level—making relief complicated for struggling 
municipalities. 
Other states have no authorizing statute.75 Although a few of these states 
affirmatively ban municipalities from filing for bankruptcy, in most states, there is 
simply nothing on the books to indicate whether filing for bankruptcy is acceptable 
or not. In these states, municipalities may file for bankruptcy only if they seek 
explicit permission or changes to state legislation, a process that can be time-
consuming and expensive, not to mention fraught with political tension.76 In practice 
then, the specific authorization requirement has made it very difficult for 
municipalities to obtain Chapter 9 relief. 
 
(c)  The entity must be insolvent 
 
Insolvency under the Bankruptcy Code is defined to mean that the municipality 
is “generally not paying its debts as they become due” or is “unable to pay its debts 
as they become due.”77 In recent years, courts have been receptive to new and 
creative illustrations of insolvency.78 For example, a court may analyze the 
municipality’s cash flow, budgets, and balance sheets, or its service-delivery 
abilities, to determine whether the municipality is insolvent.79 Municipalities are not 
required to have raised taxes to the legal limit to be considered insolvent.80 To prove 
insolvency, however, municipalities must often produce “substantial financial and 
accounting evidence.”81 
 
(d)  The entity must be willing to adjust its debts by implementing a plan 
 
This requirement is usually interpreted to mean that the municipality must show 
that it is filing for bankruptcy in order to develop a plan of adjustment, rather than 
                                                 
75 Kevane, supra note 73, at 2. 
76 Paul R. Glassman, A Practical Guide to Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy, in 
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 203, 210 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011); see also Bill 
Rochelle & Sherri Toub, Suffolk Off-Track Betting Confirms Plan in Second Chapter 9 After 
Three Years, 26 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 1521, 1536 (2014) (noting that Suffolk Off-Track 
Betting’s first bankruptcy was dismissed after the judge determined that the county 
legislature was not authorized under state law to give the municipality permission to file and 
that a year later, the state legislature passed a bill authorizing the municipality to file for 
bankruptcy). 
77 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
78 Lynn M. Brimer et al., Measuring Service-Delivery Insolvency in Chapter 9, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2014, at 26, 27 (citing the Stockton bankruptcy, where the court 
examined “service-delivery insolvency”). 
79 Id. at 26. 
80 Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1005. 
81 Glassman, supra note 76, at 211. 
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to buy time or avoid creditors.82 Therefore, courts will look for the municipality to 
have developed some sort of plan or outline of a plan when it decides to file.83  
 
(e)  The entity must demonstrate some sort of relationship with creditors 
 
The final eligibility prong requires demonstration of one of four possibilities 
with respect to this relationship.84 The municipal entity must show it:  
 
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in 
amount of the claims of each class that . . . [will be] impair[ed] under a 
plan . . . ;  
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors, and has failed to obtain the 
[necessary] agreement . . . ; 
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is 
impracticable; or  
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that 
is avoidable [as a preference].85 
 
The second and third possibilities are frequently the subject of eligibility 
battles. Notably, the second possibility only requires the debtor to negotiate in good 
faith; in other words, no reciprocal good-faith requirement exists for creditors.86 
What it means to negotiate in “good faith” is unsettled under the law, meaning that 
debtors may manipulate the facts in order to demonstrate that good-faith 
negotiations have occurred.87 The third possibility, often used by larger cities and 
towns, requires the debtor to negotiate with large groups of creditors.88 Detroit is the 
                                                 
82 Eric S. Pommer & Marc M. Friedman, Municipal Bankruptcy and Its Effect on 
Government Contractors, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 249, 254 (1996). 
83 In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 297 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the good-
faith negotiation requirement means that “some outline or term sheet of a plan which 
designates classes of creditors and their treatment is necessary”). Although the extent to 
which a municipality must have already developed a plan varies depending on the case, 
requiring a municipality to have some sort of plan at all is somewhat of a puzzle, given that 
one of Chapter 9’s arguable advantages is the breathing space it provides for municipalities 
to assess their situation and develop a workable plan. Interpreting this requirement to mean 
that municipalities must have a plan or solid plan idea in place at the outset could diminish 
the value of this breathing space. See John J. Rapisardi et al., Chapter 9: A Big Stick, Rarely 
Used, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 153, 157 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (noting 
that the Bankruptcy Code requires a municipal debtor to file its plan with its bankruptcy 
petition, but that the court may also set a later date). 
84 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(A)–(D) (2012). 
85 Id.  
86 See Darby et al., supra note 69, at 343. 
87 See In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 274, 278–79 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that courts disagree over what is required to show that good-faith 
negotiations have occurred but agree that “no formal complete plan” is necessary). 
88 In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 176–79 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).  
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most recent and notable municipal entity to have utilized this possibility to meet this 
eligibility requirement.89 
The manipulability of the “good faith” and “impracticability” measures has 
come to Congress’s attention. In 2014, Representative John Conyers introduced 
legislation to amend §109 to require a municipality to negotiate with creditors before 
seeking Chapter 9 protection unless such negotiations would be “impossible” rather 
than impracticable.90 The bill also proposed changing the definition of “good 
faith.”91  
 
2.  Extensive Eligibility Fights 
 
Litigation over whether a municipal debtor has met all of the requirements for 
Chapter 9 eligibility is common in the bankruptcy cases of towns and cities. This is 
in part because of the structure of the eligibility requirements. Since a debtor must 
usually negotiate with creditors prior to filing a case, if a Chapter 9 case is in fact 
filed, creditors opposed to the debtor’s position are already lined up and ready to 
fight before the case gets off the ground.92 This is in stark contrast to a Chapter 11 
case, where there are virtually no eligibility requirements and where the bankruptcy 
filing may even come as a surprise to some creditors.93 
Chapter 9 eligibility battles are difficult for several reasons. As previously 
mentioned, many of the requirements, such as the necessity of negotiating with 
creditors in “good faith,” have devolved into opaque and confusing standards, as 
judges attempt to apply the requirements to a variety of municipal entities, each 
charged with negotiating with vastly different groups of creditors.94 
                                                 
89 Joseph Lichterman & Bernie Woodall, In Largest-Ever U.S. City Bankruptcy, Cuts 
Coming for Detroit Creditors, Retirees, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2013, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-judge-idUSBRE9B20PZ2013 
1203 [https://perma.cc/3UQV-R49G]. 
90 Stephanie M. Acree, Conyers Introduces Bills Protecting Workers in Ch. 9 Cases; 
Preventing Utility Termination, 26 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 985, 989 (2014). 
91 Id. Specifically, the bill would require the phrase “good faith” to be interpreted 
according to the National Labor Relations Act, a stricter standard. Kyle Glazier, Bill Would 
Make Chapter 9 Tough to Pursue, BOND BUYER (Jan. 8, 2015, 1:41 PM) (on file with the 
Utah Law Review), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washington-budget-finance/bill-
would-make-chapter-9-tough-to-pursue-1069372-1.html. Since being introduced in the 
House of Representatives in July 2014, the bill has received little attention. See id. 
92 Glassman, supra note 76, at 208–09; see also Jacoby, supra note 64, at 855 (noting 
that the early days of Detroit’s bankruptcy were characterized by multiple objections from 
creditors). 
93 See Bret A. Maidman, Chapter 13 v. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy for Small Business 
Owners, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/chapter-13-chapter-11-
bankruptcy-small-business-owners.html [http://perma.cc/52DT-LNEW] (last visited Dec. 2, 
2015) (“[A]lmost anyone can file bankruptcy under Chapter 11. . . . There are no debt or 
income requirements or limitations for filing . . . .”). 
94 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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The position of the court and creditors in a Chapter 9 case provides further 
insight into why eligibility is such a contentious issue. Once again responding to 
concerns that Chapter 9 interferes with states’ ability to govern their internal 
commercial affairs, Congress gave the bankruptcy judge a very minor role to play 
in Chapter 9 cases.95 For example, under Chapter 9, bankruptcy courts are prohibited 
from interfering with a municipality’s property and revenue absent the 
municipality’s consent, meaning that a municipality may spend its money in any 
way that it likes without court oversight.96 Practically speaking then, eligibility 
hearings are one of the few times in a Chapter 9 case where the judge, and the 
creditors, can have a say in how the case proceeds.97 In contrast to Chapter 11, where 
creditors typically can and do exercise their right to participate in numerous 
hearings, in Chapter 9, there are generally few bankruptcy court hearings.98 
Furthermore, unlike in Chapter 11, Chapter 9 does not permit creditors to file a 
competing plan of adjustment. Instead, the municipality is the only entity that can 
present a plan of adjustment for its debts, and creditors must simply vote for or 
against that plan.99 Finally, creditors are limited in both the information they can 
access100 and the type of relief they can request from the bankruptcy court. For 
example, creditors may not convert the case to another bankruptcy chapter, nor, in 
general, may they appoint a trustee or examiner to oversee the municipality’s 
operations and affairs.101 Creditors struggle with these limitations and often feel as 
though they cannot maximize their recoveries under Chapter 9.102 Thus, creditors 
                                                 
95 Specifically, Sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy Code actively constrain the 
bankruptcy courts. See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (confirming that the state controls the 
municipality); Id. § 904 (preventing courts from interfering with the debtor’s political 
powers, property, revenues, and uses of certain property). 
96 Turscak et al., supra note 56, at 56. 
97 Stanley H. McGuffin, Chapter 9 As a Remedy for Financially Stressed 
Municipalities, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 70–76 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011). 
98 Id. at 72–74. 
99 Id. at 76. 
100 Kenneth R. Epstein & Nelly Almeida, The Need for Greater Transparency in 
Municipal Bankruptcies, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014), http://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/the-need-for-greater-transparency-in-municipal-bank 
ruptcies/ [http://perma.cc/QRB6-QYP9] (arguing that a lack of mandatory disclosure 
requirements for Chapter 9 debtors has resulted “in burdensome discovery . . . which 
increases creditor and debtor litigation costs and diminishes the pool of assets available to 
pay claims”). 
101 McGuffin, supra note 97, at 76. 
102 Lance Duroni, Unhappy Creditors Open Assault on Detroit Ch. 9 Plan, LAW 360 
(Sept. 3, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/573429/unhappy-creditors-open-
assault-on-detroit-ch-9-plan [https://perma.cc/23XL-EAZR] (describing the concerns 
Detroit’s bond insurers expressed over the city’s decision to pay its retirees more than its 
financial creditors); see also Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation in Chapter 9 
Bankruptcies: Mitigating Municipal Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 263 (2012) (“The 
administrative costs and the length of a Chapter 9 proceeding have the potential to seriously 
impair what is likely to be an already impaired group of creditors.”). 
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will fight a municipality’s entry into bankruptcy court tooth and nail.103 The 
truncated powers of creditors, sometimes touted as one of Chapter 9’s chief 
benefits,104 help explain why creditors may seize on the eligibility hearing as a 
chance to assert what little influence they have in a Chapter 9 case.105 
Once a municipal debtor passes through the eligibility gate, courts have held 
that federal bankruptcy law (not state law) governs the issues that arise within the 
case. Thus, the generally accepted rule is that states that authorize municipalities to 
use Chapter 9 must accept Chapter 9 in its totality.106 For this reason, even a state 
with a statute that authorizes Chapter 9 relief will sometimes object to a 
municipality’s eligibility to file over concerns that federal bankruptcy law will 
interfere with the state’s wishes for the municipality. For example, Pennsylvania 
initially authorized Chapter 9 relief for cities like Harrisburg, but when Harrisburg 
actually sought to file for bankruptcy, the state passed a new law blocking access to 
federal relief and objected strenuously to Harrisburg’s attempts to file for Chapter 
9.107 
Although the stakes are high in an eligibility battle, denial of eligibility for 
bankruptcy protection does not necessarily spell the end of a municipality’s 
existence. In some instances, the judge might dismiss the case because the debtor 
has regained its financial footing, in which case the municipality may be able to 
continue to function on its own.108 In other cases, however, the municipality is left 
to its own devices. For example, after its second petition for bankruptcy relief was 
denied, the village of Washington Park, Illinois continued to struggle with its debts 
and eventually was forced to consider disbanding its police force, a move that, 
though likely financially necessary, was hardly wise in light of the village’s other 
                                                 
103 Denniston, supra note 102, at 268 (“Whether a municipality has negotiated in good 
faith with its creditors before filing a petition is almost always litigated in a Chapter 9 case.”). 
104 Lauren M. Wolfe, The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal Bankruptcy 
in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 566 (2012) (describing “cram down” and creditors’ weaker 
bargaining position as benefits of Chapter 9). 
105 See In re City of Desert Hot Springs, 327 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Congress, 
in an effort to avoid possible constitutional problems, designed [C]hapter 9 of the bankruptcy 
code in a manner much different from the other chapters. Many of the protections afforded 
to creditors in the other chapters are missing in [C]hapter 9.”). 
106 Trotter, supra note 15, at 76. 
107 See South & Egan, supra note 49. 
108 See, e.g., RICHARD LEVIN ET AL., CRAVATH, SWAINE, & MOORE LLP, SOME CAUSES 
OF MUNICIPAL DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY (2011), 
https://www.nabl.org/portals/0/documents/panel_21_-_levin_material.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/JDR7-UKMJ] (noting that the Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing by the City of Gould, Arkansas 
was dismissed after the municipality regained financial stability); Rick Benedict, Illinois 
Village Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, DAILYREPORTER.COM (Aug. 4, 2009, 12:41 PM), 
http://dailyreporter.com/2009/08/04/illinois-village-seeks-bankruptcy-protection/ 
[http://perma.cc/2K29-773F] (describing Washington Park’s first bankruptcy, which “was 
dismissed because the village [briefly] emerged from insolvency”). 
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troubles, including the murder of its mayor.109 In other cases, municipalities that are 
denied federal relief may seek out remedies under state law. For example, after being 
denied bankruptcy relief, Harrisburg entered Pennsylvania’s state insolvency 
system.110 In other scenarios, the municipality’s creditors may seek a writ of 
mandamus in state court to compel the municipality to raise taxes.111 Nevertheless, 
the potential loss of essential services after being denied Chapter 9 eligibility means 
that municipalities that have decided to file will often fight strenuously to have their 
case deemed eligible for bankruptcy relief. Unfortunately, the drain on time, 
resources, and money to fight this eligibility battle is substantial. 
 
3.  The Harms of Eligibility Battles 
 
An eligibility fight can easily take on a life of its own in a municipal bankruptcy 
case. This is true even where it is ultimately determined that the municipality is 
ineligible for relief. For example, at the time of Washington Park’s bankruptcy, 
Illinois had not enabled the municipality to declare bankruptcy.112 In fact, legal 
precedent existed showing that municipalities such as Washington Park were not 
unconditionally authorized to file for Chapter 9 in Illinois.113 Nevertheless, it took 
over a year for the bankruptcy judge to throw out Washington Park’s case, leaving 
the town in limbo during that time.114 
It is often difficult for the municipality to amass the evidence necessary to prove 
that it meets the eligibility requirements. This is particularly true in the case of 
insolvency. Some cities and towns may seek Chapter 9 relief only after a new 
administration enters office and learns that the previous administration has created 
a financial disaster. The new administration is forced to rely on scant or inaccurate 
record-keeping by the previous administration in order to make its case for 
                                                 
109 Tim Jones, Illinois Stripper Haven Shows States Miss Bankruptcy Mess, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 23, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-
24/illinois-stripper-haven-shows-states-miss-bankruptcy-mess.html [http://perma.cc/L33K-
T4Y3] (noting that all but one member of the village’s fire department had been laid off and 
that the police chief had urged city leaders to shut down the department). 
110 See Act 47 Financial Distress, PA. DEP’T COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV., 
http://www.newpa.com/local-government/services-we-provide-local-governments/request-
assistance/list-act-47-distress-determinations [http://perma.cc/37CP-Z4K3] (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2015) (listing distress determinations). 
111 Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 
1042 (1997). 
112 Five Cities That Were Denied Chapter 9 Protection in the Past, MICH. RADIO (July 
25, 2013), http://michiganradio.org/post/five-cities-were-denied-chapter-9-protection-past 
[http://perma.cc/NU8Y-LKUV]. 
113 In re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake Cty., 336 B.R. 387, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2006) (“Independent research by the Court has not revealed any Illinois statute containing 
the specific authorization required by § 109(c)(2).”). 
114 Jim Suhr, Judge Throws Out Ill. Village’s Bankruptcy Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Jan. 10, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/judge-throws-ill-villages-bankruptcy-case-
20110110-110319-519.html [http://perma.cc/7HRP-KLAL]. 
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eligibility. For example, the city of Millport, Alabama filed for bankruptcy after the 
newly elected mayor discovered that the town was almost $3.5 million behind in 
payments.115 The former administration neither budgeted nor properly accounted for 
the town’s revenues and expenditures, making it difficult for the new administration 
to document the city’s insolvency.116 Similarly, after the longtime mayor of Moffett, 
Oklahoma died, the town learned that he had incurred large debts on the town’s 
behalf without the knowledge or consent of its citizens.117 When financial distress 
comes as a shock to citizens and officials, it can be difficult to gather the evidence 
to definitively prove insolvency.118 
As eligibility, rather than debt relief, becomes the focus, municipalities pour 
time and resources that could otherwise be directed toward putting together a plan 
of adjustment into the eligibility proceeding. The fiscal problems fade into the 
background, as litigation takes up more and more of officials’ time. Several 
examples illustrate this point. 
The city of Vallejo, California spent three and a half months locked in an 
eligibility battle, where resources were diverted from the debtor’s ultimate goal of 
developing a plan and emerging from bankruptcy.119 The evidentiary hearing alone 
went on for eight days, as the nondebtor parties pursued the litigation as a way to 
gain leverage in their negotiations with the debtor.120 Although the eligibility issue 
was ultimately decided in Vallejo’s favor, creditors promptly appealed, prolonging 
the battle. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed Vallejo’s 
eligibility over a year after Vallejo had initially filed its Chapter 9 petition.121 
Although a multibillion-dollar company may well be able to handle the expense and 
effort needed to engage in such protracted fights by cutting costs in other areas, a 
city like Vallejo that is already struggling to provide basic public services cannot cut 
services further in order to fight such a battle and may put itself further into debt in 
order to keep the lights on while it establishes eligibility for Chapter 9 relief. 
                                                 
115 Keren H. Deal, An Examination of Municipal Finance Reform Regarding Municipal 
Bankruptcies in the United States 165–66 (Aug. 4, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Auburn University), https://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handle/10415/956/DEAL_KEREN_ 
35.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/UQD7-D7KQ]. 
116 Id. 
117 Tony Thornton & Sheila Stogsdill, Moffett Seeks Bankruptcy Protection: Town 
Bears Toll of Designation as a Speed Trap and Debts Incurred by the Late Mayor, NEWSOK 
(Feb. 2, 2007), http://newsok.com/moffett-seeks-bankruptcy-protectionbrspan-classhl2town 
-bears-toll-of-designation-as-a-speed-trap-and-debts-incurred-by-the-late-mayor.span/ 
article/3007448 [http://perma.cc/MX2D-XNSF]. 
118 Even cities that have not experienced a significant change in administration may 
find it difficult to assemble complete and accurate financial information. In Stockton, 
California’s eligibility dispute, for example, creditors argued that Stockton was relying on 
outdated financial data. See Preliminary Objection of Assured Guaranty Corp. and Assured 
Guaranty Municipal Corp. to Debtor’s Chapter 9 Petition and Statement of Qualifications at 
10–11, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012). 
119 Glassman, supra note 76, at 215. 
120 Id. 
121 In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 285 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
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Also in California, Stockton and San Bernardino have followed in Vallejo’s 
footsteps. It took almost a year for the bankruptcy court to decide that the city of 
Stockton was eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor.122 During this time, Stockton spent 
an enormous amount of time and money just trying to stay in bankruptcy while its 
infrastructure took a severe hit. Homicide rates jumped as police officers left the city 
in droves.123 The city cut its workforce by 30% and its budget by $90 million.124 Far 
from expressing concern over these alarming public health and safety conditions, 
the creditors opposed to the city’s eligibility pressed on, using what Stockton’s city 
manager called a “scorched-earth” strategy designed to make the city waste 
additional time and money.125 By the time Stockton’s eligibility was finally decided, 
the city had spent over $6 million on mediation and legal costs related to the 
eligibility fight alone.126 This number represented approximately half of the money 
Stockton had budgeted for its entire bankruptcy that year.127 
Stockton’s eligibility battle illustrates that creditors’ incentives are generally 
not aligned with the public health and safety concerns of a municipality. This is a 
key contrast from a business bankruptcy, where creditors, shareholders, and the 
debtor often see keeping the business going as a way to maximize value for all 
parties involved.128 
The city of San Bernardino, California took a year to get through its eligibility 
fight.129 Even after it was deemed eligible for Chapter 9 relief, one creditor, the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”), appealed the 
eligibility decision, forcing the city to pay even more money fighting for eligibility, 
when the real issue CalPERS cared about (nonpayment) was not at stake in the 
                                                 
122 In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 776–77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
123 Cambi Brown, Stockton’s Homicide Rate Sees Drastic Drop Following Record-
Breaking Year, CBS SACRAMENTO (Dec. 29, 2013, 11:12 PM), 
http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2013/12/29/stocktons-homicide-rate-sees-drastic-drop-
following-record-breaking-year/ [http://perma.cc/N6YP-52JZ] (noting that in 2012, “amidst 
the city’s money trouble and bankruptcy, violence erupted” and that a “record-setting 71 
people were murdered”). 
124 Robin Respaut, Trial Starts Monday to Determine If Stockton Can Exit Bankruptcy, 
REUTERS (May 11, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/11/municipals-
stockton-preview-idUSL2N0NV1BO20140511 [http://perma.cc/CC85-4A64]. 
125 Jonathan Weber, Court Says City of Stockton, California May Proceed with 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/ 
us-stockton-bankruptcy-idUSBRE9300GP20130402 [https://perma.cc/DX75-JW4Y]. 
126 Id. 
127 CITY OF STOCKTON, ANNUAL BUDGET 2013–2014, at A-14, 
http://www.stocktongov.com/files/13-14_Adopted_Budget_.pdf [http://perma.cc/TW8E-
YAFU] (showing adopted budget for fiscal year 2013-2014 as approximately $12.5 million). 
128 See Moberg & Wagner, supra note 55, at 32 (“In commercial corporations, the 
interests of shareholders and managers are not in conflict with one another because they share 
a common interest in efficient corporate operation.”). 
129 Liz Farmer, San Bernardino Becomes 3rd California City to Get Bankruptcy 
Protection, GOVERNING (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/gov-judge-
awards-san-bernardino-bankruptcy-protection.html [http://perma.cc/H8Q4-XF42]. 
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eligibility hearing.130 San Bernardino’s eligibility battle is an example of how 
creditors use eligibility as a proxy for another issue that they will have more 
difficulty fighting once the debtor enters bankruptcy due to the limited powers of 
the court and creditors in a Chapter 9 case. 
Eligibility also sometimes requires courts to examine complex state law. The 
question of eligibility for two Alabama municipalities, Jefferson County and 
Prichard, was ultimately determined to require interpretation of an arcane state 
statute.131 Thus, the bankruptcy cases were stayed while the question proceeded to 
the Alabama Supreme Court.132 Prichard finally received permission to proceed two 
and a half years after it had initially sought bankruptcy relief.133 During the interim 
period, Prichard ceased paying pensions to its retirees.134  
Finally, the city of Detroit spent nearly $23 million in fees to lawyers, 
consultants, and financial advisers in the first three months of its bankruptcy 
alone.135 A substantial amount of this money was spent in pursuit of an eligibility 
determination.136 That determination took over four months, and seven different 
entities appealed the determination, prolonging an already expensive and time-
consuming process.137 
Clearly, eligibility battles can take a significant amount of time and divert 
resources from both the debtor and creditors. All parties must hire attorneys and 
devote time to briefing and litigating the eligibility elements. Further, although legal 
fees must be disclosed in a Chapter 9 case, municipalities are not subject to 
bankruptcy court approval of professional fee payments.138 This means that 
                                                 
130 C. Scott Pryor, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose. Or Is It the Other Way Around? PRYOR 
THOUGHTS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/2013/11/heads-i-win-tails-
you-lose-or-is-it.html [http://perma.cc/UNV5-9H33]. 
131 See Darby et al., supra note 69, at 337–38 (citing the Jefferson County case, where 
eligibility for bankruptcy was decided by the Alabama Supreme Court based on 
interpretation of an old state statute). 
132 Id. 
133 Will Hueske, Chapter 9 Update: Alabama Municipalities Eligible As “Debtors” 
Under Section 109(c), WEIL BANKR. BLOG (May 22, 2012), http://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/chapter-9-update-alabama-municipalities-eligible-as-
debtors-under-section-109c/ [http://perma.cc/Q999-E236]. 
134 Cate Long, The Real History of Public Pensions in Bankruptcy, REUTERS: 
MUNILAND (Aug. 8, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2013/08/08/the-real-history-
of-public-pensions-in-bankruptcy/ [http://perma.cc/QB4L-F2L9]. 
135 Joseph Lichterman, Detroit Has Paid $23 Million to Consultants Through October 
1, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-usa-
detroit-fees-idUSBRE9AK01S20131121 [http://perma.cc/H5W9-HMGS]. 
136 See id. 
137 Federal Court Asked to Suspend Detroit Bankruptcy Appeals, REUTERS (July 31, 
2014, 7:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/usa-detroit-bankruptcy-
appeals-idUSL2N0Q63DH20140731 [http://perma.cc/8SDG-SHEM]. 
138 JONES DAY, supra note 9, at 9. This is distinct from the Chapter 11 context, where 
debtors are prohibited from retaining or paying professionals without bankruptcy court 
approval. Id. 
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municipalities could be unrestrained in terms of the fees they can run up in an 
eligibility proceeding, and eligibility, of course, can take a substantial bite out of a 
municipal entity’s operating budget. 
The holdout creditor that Chapter 9 was designed to thwart is also usually the 
individual creditor most directly affected by the impending Chapter 9 case and the 
creditor most likely to spearhead the eligibility litigation.139 In contrast to Chapter 
11, where access to bankruptcy court is straightforward, municipalities rarely have 
unimpeded access to bankruptcy relief.140 Prolonged eligibility battles can hurt the 
holdout creditor as well as the debtor, as the money that the debtor spends in an 
eligibility fight is money that would otherwise be available to pay creditors or bolster 
public services. 
The justification for the stringent eligibility requirements lies in the Bankruptcy 
Code drafters’ concern with ensuring that states maintained control over their 
municipalities’ commercial affairs.141 The requirements reflect the drafters’ 
intention to give municipalities access to federal debt relief only if states approve.142 
Although these concerns are important, in practice, the dual state and federal 
approval systems create high barriers, which may ultimately harm the municipal 
entities Chapter 9 was intended to help. 
The very design of Chapter 9 encourages holdout creditors to stand their ground 
and makes it difficult for entities in severe distress to access relief. The incentives 
created by the eligibility requirements lead to exactly the opposite result of what 
Chapter 9 was designed to achieve: the holdout creditor remains in play, and debtors 
run up costs rather than reduce them. Given these harms, it is rightfully puzzling that 
municipalities nevertheless continue to seek entry into Chapter 9. Although Chapter 
9 may not be municipalities’ preferred option, it is worth exploring whether the 
benefits are worth the struggle. 
 
III.  CHAPTER 9’S LIMITATIONS 
 
As seen with eligibility hearings, elements of Chapter 9’s structure make it 
difficult to utilize successfully in practice. Section II.A explores why corporate 
bankruptcy is a poor model for municipal bankruptcy due to key structural and 
theoretical differences between municipalities and corporations. Using recent 
municipal bankruptcy cases, section II.B also illustrates that use of Chapter 9 often 
results in outcomes that are inconsistent with foundational bankruptcy principles. 
By demonstrating how Chapter 11 is an ill-fitting model for Chapter 9 and how 
                                                 
139 See Kevane, supra note 73, at 3. 
140 See Steven Lessard & Richard Ngo, Riding the Juice Train to Bankruptcy: Chapter 
9 Eligibility After In re Las Vegas Monorail Company, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
387, 392–93 (2011). 
141 Mary L. Young, Keeping a Municipal Foot in the Chapter 9 Door: Eligibility 
Requirements for Municipal Bankruptcies, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 309, 314 (1997). 
142 See Nicholas B. Bangos, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Dark Side of the 
Moon, 3 WESTLAW J. BANKR. 1, 6 (2011), 8 NO. 3 WJBKR 1. 
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Chapter 9 in practice diverges from optimal bankruptcy outcomes, this Part paves 
the way for a call to reform the municipal bankruptcy system. 
 
A.  Key Differences Between Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 
 
Once a municipality clears the eligibility hurdle, Chapter 9 is supposed to 
provide municipalities with more power than a corporate debtor has in Chapter 11.143 
This significant power is yet another reason the barriers to entry for Chapter 9 are 
so high: it is thought that municipalities should not be able to wield this power 
easily.144 On paper, a municipality’s powers do indeed seem substantial; in practice, 
however, these powers are often not as significant as they seem. Municipalities 
under political pressure, for example, may be hesitant to exercise their bankruptcy 
powers to reform contracts or impair pensions. 
The stark structural differences between a corporate entity and a municipality 
indicate that Chapter 11 rules are ill-suited to resolve municipal financial problems. 
For example, unlike a business, a city or town cannot be liquidated or sold to another 
entity.145 Furthermore, the composition of claims holders in a municipal bankruptcy 
looks very different from that of a business bankruptcy, making it difficult to figure 
out how concepts that are well developed in Chapter 11 apply to Chapter 9.146 Rules 
that work well in Chapter 11, such as those relating to debt adjustment, contract 
assumption and rejection, financing, and plan confirmation, fail to reach the same 
outcomes in Chapter 9. 
 
1.  Debt Adjustments 
 
Debt adjustment is the central function of Chapter 9, yet the extent of debt that 
can be adjusted is not always clear.147 For example, nonconsensual modification of 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 16, at 356. “[O]nce the bankruptcy filing is approved, 
the municipality has greater powers than a regular corporate debtor does.” Id. These powers 
include an exclusive right to submit a plan of debt adjustment, the ability of local leaders to 
continue to manage the municipality, and the bankruptcy court’s inability to interfere with 
the municipality’s political powers. Id. at 356–57. 
144 Kordana, supra note 111, at 1043 (“The favorable bargaining position granted to a 
municipal debtor might suggest that its ability to enter Chapter 9 would need to be 
restricted.”). 
145 For this reason, some scholars have argued that a more apt model for Chapter 9 is 
individual bankruptcy rather than corporate bankruptcy. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 41, at 
2227–28. 
146 See, e.g., Richard L. Epling et al., Monorail, Monorail, Monorail: Chapter 9 and 
Restructuring Issues Relating to Municipal Authorities, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
225, 235 (2011) (“In Chapter 9, the application of the traditional ‘fair and equitable’ or ‘cram 
down’ power is unclear.”); Kordana, supra note 111, at 1057 (“It is, admittedly, difficult to 
apply the absolute priority rule to a bankrupt municipality.”). 
147 See David S. Kupetz, Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Code, 27 
URB. LAW. 531, 531–32 (1995) (noting the similarity of general policy considerations 
underlying municipal debt adjustment and Chapter 11 reorganization but stating that 
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pensions is a hotly contested issue in Chapter 9.148 Some states have constitutional 
provisions prohibiting municipalities from modifying or impairing accrued pension 
benefits, raising the question of whether bankruptcy law can trump these 
provisions.149 In other circumstances, municipal debtors sometimes favor pension 
claims over other debt, raising questions about whether this is permissible under 
bankruptcy priority rules.150 Pension obligations typically make up a significant 
portion of a struggling municipality’s liabilities, making resolution of these issues 
critical for an effective debt adjustment.151 The extent to which a municipality’s need 
to protect city employees and encourage them to work for the municipality must be 
reconciled with the municipality’s ability to rid itself of burdensome debt obligations 
remains unresolved. This lack of clarity undermines predictability in the law, leaving 
municipalities uncertain as to whether and how they may adjust pensions in 
bankruptcy, and spurring on costly litigation in an attempt to resolve the matter.152 
In contrast to Chapter 11, where most pre-petition debt is dischargeable, in 
Chapter 9, municipalities may face limitations on the types of debt they can adjust.153 
For example, special revenue bonds and leases are not eligible for adjustment in 
Chapter 9.154 This means that in a bankruptcy like Detroit’s, where special revenue 
debt made up over 30% of the city’s liabilities, the municipality will not be able to 
                                                 
municipal bankruptcy is “quite unlike” other bankruptcies and acknowledging that 
“application of the term ‘bankruptcy’ to Chapter 9 is a misnomer”). 
148 See generally Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination 
in Municipal Bankruptcy (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 2014-56), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493529 [http://perma.cc/J334-
YABW] (describing trend of municipalities offering more generous recovery on pension 
claims than on other claims and arguing that bankruptcy’s unfair discrimination standard 
prevents this outcome if disfavored creditors object). 
149 See Chung, supra note 58, at 717–18. Some courts have answered this question in 
the affirmative. See Lichterman & Woodall, supra note 89 (noting that the Michigan 
Attorney General “argued that pension rights are protected by the state constitution,” but the 
judge in the Detroit case cut pensions anyway). 
150 Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 612 (2014) (summarizing the confusion over 
payment priority between retirees and bondholders). 
151 A recent study concluded that there was a $1 trillion gap between the amount 
actually set aside by states and localities to pay pensions and other benefits, and the estimated 
actual cost of those obligations. See Chung, supra note 58, at 669 (discussing the study and 
its implications). 
152 See, e.g., Dale Kasler, Creditors Launch Challenge to CalPERS, Pensions in San 
Bernardino Bankruptcy, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 8, 2015, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article5638170.html [http://perma.cc/2W3C-67QH]. 
153 See Francisco Vazquez & Eric Daucher, Restructuring a Municipality Under 
Chapter 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2010, at 50, 51–52. 
154 See Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy: The New “New Thing”? 
Part II, BUS. L. TODAY, June 2011, at 1, 2 (noting that “the legislative history to Chapter 9 
clarifies that industrial revenue bonds, issued by municipalities purely as conduits for private 
entities, are excluded from Chapter 9”).  
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effectuate a complete debt adjustment.155 Municipalities may be further discouraged 
from adjusting debts out of concern that impairing debt may limit their access to 
capital markets and future funding.156 
 
2.  Contract Assumption and Rejection 
 
One of the most touted advantages of Chapter 9 is that it gives municipal 
debtors the ability to renegotiate and reject contracts.157 Indeed, this is a key 
advantage of federal bankruptcy relief, which allows debtors to assume or reject 
executory contracts, including collective bargaining agreements, despite contrary 
state law provisions.158 For municipalities, this ability is limited in practice. Unlike 
in Chapter 11, where the statute clearly provides the standard for rejection or 
modification of a collective bargaining agreement,159 uncertainty remains in Chapter 
9 as to whether and how a debtor may modify and reject these agreements.160 This 
makes it difficult for municipal debtors to modify their agreements easily or 
quickly.161 
 
3.  Financing 
 
Another key distinction between municipal bankruptcy and business 
bankruptcy further complicates the relief available to a municipality. In a business 
case, the pre-petition and post-petition entities are often considered completely 
separate. A line is drawn separating the pre-petition entity from the “new company” 
                                                 
155 Chung, supra note 58, at 667–68. 
156 DABNEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 37–47. 
157 Chung, supra note 14, at 831 (“While bankruptcy law endeavors to provide a system 
of orderly, predictable rules or treatment of parties whose contracts are impaired, that does 
not change the starring role of contract impairment in bankruptcy.” (emphasis added) 
(quoting In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)). 
158 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 112 (1978) (noting that collective bargaining agreements 
and other executory contracts “may be rejected despite contrary State laws”). 
159 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012). 
160 Trotter, supra note 15, at 81 (noting that the case law creates “a cloud of uncertainty 
over the issues of modification and rejection of collective bargaining agreements in Chapter 
9”). 
161 Proposed legislation would require employees to consent to changes in contracts, 
including changes to pension and health-care benefits. William Selway, House Democrats 
Seek to Protect Workers in Municipal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-07-17/house-democrats-seek-to-protect-
workers-in-municipal-bankruptcy.html [http://perma.cc/R6CP-5L64]. Other legislation 
would make it more difficult for municipal debtors to cut retiree benefits in bankruptcy at 
all. Id. Although this legislation attempts to strike a balance between allowing insolvent 
municipalities to find relief and protecting promised core contract rights, it may undercut the 
ability of a Chapter 9 debtor to renegotiate contracts in bankruptcy. 
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or the “estate” once a company files for bankruptcy.162 This line drawing is often 
reinforced by changes in management or even a sale of the company’s assets to a 
new entity. In municipal bankruptcies, however, the line between the pre-petition 
municipality and the post-petition entity is decidedly blurred. Although it has filed 
for bankruptcy, the municipality lacks an “estate,” or a body of assets that creditors 
can look to for recovery, in part because it lacks the ability to liquidate.163 Similarly, 
the bankruptcy court lacks the ability to force the municipality to sell any property 
for the benefit of creditors.164 In essence, no equivalent “new municipality” is forged 
from the bankruptcy. Because the municipality can never completely separate itself 
from its pre-bankruptcy “self,” as a business can, it may have a much more difficult 
time emerging from bankruptcy as a financially and operationally sound entity. 
This problem is evident when it comes to bankruptcy financing. Typically, 
when a business files for bankruptcy, it may take advantage of Bankruptcy Code 
provisions and obtain new funding to finance the costs of the case.165 Although the 
same Code provisions apply in a Chapter 9 case, the court’s powers to order a 
municipal debtor to comply with a lender’s typically exacting requirements are 
extraordinarily limited.166 Thus, municipal entities typically do not receive post-
petition financing in bankruptcy.167 Even once a municipality has come up with a 
plan of adjustment, it may be on its own when it comes to finding the money to pay 
creditors under that plan. The municipality may of course look to taxpayers to raise 
revenue, but the ability to obtain financing from an outside lender could mitigate the 
need to raise taxes, encouraging residents to remain in the municipality rather than 
leave for a city or town with a lower tax rate. 
 
4.  Political Constraints 
 
Municipalities are inherently political entities168 and may be influenced to a 
greater degree than businesses by the state and local politics that surround them. 
Many scholars have acknowledged Chapter 9’s inability to address certain political 
problems, such as difficulties with mobilizing constituencies in support of debt 
                                                 
162 For example, the reorganized, post-bankruptcy General Motors is consistently 
referred to as the “new GM” to distinguish it from the pre-bankruptcy “old GM.” See, e.g., 
General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (2010). 
163 Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy 16 (Mar. 3, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=253 
4856 [https://perma.cc/3ZVJ-KG3S] (noting that a creditor cannot respond to municipal 
default by seizing city assets). 
164 Id. at 21. 
165 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
166 See Manny Grillo, DIP Loans: A New Pocketbook for Distressed Municipalities?, 
MUNIBK BLOG (Sept. 24. 2012), http://blog.munibk.com/dip-loans-a-new-pocketbook-for-
distressed-municipalities [http://perma.cc/2VX3-V24H]. 
167 Id. 
168 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (defining a municipality as “a political subdivision . . . of a 
state”). 
332 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
adjustment or local officials’ vulnerability to political influence.169 Although no 
form of bankruptcy is intended to address political problems head-on, in a municipal 
bankruptcy, political problems are intertwined with the municipality’s financial 
distress to a greater degree than in a corporate or personal bankruptcy.170 For 
business bankruptcy, management’s ability to implement top-down policies is often 
significant.171 In contrast, officials running a municipality are often subject to 
extreme pressure from voters and interest groups.172 In some cases then, the solution 
to a municipality’s fiscal problems may lie, not in a debt adjustment, but in 
addressing the political incentives that drove the municipality to seek bankruptcy 
relief in the first place. 
Political problems may take the form of legal constraints on raising taxes or 
seeking new funding sources, thus preventing the municipality from taking steps to 
get its budget under control. For example, in California, Proposition 13 places a cap 
on property taxes, and Proposition 218 requires municipalities to attain the vote of 
property owners for any proposed new or increased assessments.173 The California 
Constitution also contains prohibitions on the amounts of debt a city can incur.174 If 
municipalities cannot easily raise new funds without resorting to the political 
process, they will have a more difficult time emerging from bankruptcy successfully. 
In general, taxpayers and residents of a municipality are not considered parties 
in interest in a Chapter 9 case and therefore do not have a say in the bankruptcy’s 
progress, aside from the officials they elect to represent them in the governance of 
the municipality.175 Yet, because a municipality must receive regulatory and 
electoral approval in order to carry out a plan, the debtor will likely have to deal with 
the same political forces and community dynamics it faced outside of bankruptcy 
while it is in bankruptcy.176 Chapter 9 cannot provide the municipality with the tools 
                                                 
169 See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 17, at 895 (“Bankruptcy is at best unproven, and at 
worst unsuited to overtly political tasks, such as mediating among political interest groups 
and brokering fiscal federalism.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File 
Under Chapter 9: Lessons from Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 238 (2012); Elizabeth 
M. Watkins, Note, In Defense of the Chapter 9 Option: Exploring the Promise of a Municipal 
Bankruptcy As a Mechanism for Structural Political Reform, 39 J. LEGIS. 89, 97 (2013) (“The 
perfect storm for municipal default includes both internal (political) and external factors 
(socioeconomic)—some controllable and some not.”). 
170 See Moberg & Wagner, supra note 55, at 41 (“[T]he accumulation of [municipal] 
debt is more a political than a technical problem.”); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and 
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 864 (2012) (noting that “the solution to state and local fiscal crises 
is largely a matter of politics and not a matter of institutional design”).  
171 See RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4:5 (2014). 
172 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
173 See Chung, supra note 58, at 679–81. 
174 Id. at 681. 
175 Nevertheless, a “special tax payer” may object to confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan. 
11 U.S.C. § 943(a) (2012). A “special tax payer” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code and 
relates to someone who owns real property against which special assessments or special taxes 
have been levied. Id. § 902(3). 
176 Kevane, supra note 154, at 1.  
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necessary to face these forces; however, without the ability to address political 
problems, a municipality will not succeed in Chapter 9 anyway. 
A separate concern is that Chapter 9 may artificially shield debtors from their 
political problems. For example, observers of Stockton, California’s bankruptcy 
case have argued that bankruptcy simply allows the city to make a debt adjustment 
without requiring it to fix the real problems that led to its insolvency in the first 
place, such as bad fiscal policies and unsustainable pension systems.177 A California 
think tank that assessed the aftermath of the Orange County, California bankruptcy 
in the 1990s also concluded that the main issue causing Orange County’s failure was 
not a financial issue but a failure of governance.178 Thus, Chapter 9 cannot, by itself, 
resolve underlying political issues and may in fact enable a municipality to hide 
behind financial problems rather than address the political issues that have led it to 
seek bankruptcy protection in the first place. 
In order for a successful debt adjustment to occur, a municipality must often 
confront the political forces surrounding it. This means that bankruptcy is going to 
be an incomplete solution in the municipal context. Once again, due to key 
differences between a municipality and a business, bankruptcy mechanisms that may 
provide a more complete solution in Chapter 11 are at best only a partial solution in 
Chapter 9. 
 
5.  The Holdout Creditor 
 
A key benefit of bankruptcy is the ability to force parties to the bargaining table 
and, if negotiations fail, to overcome holdout creditors by “cramming down” a plan 
over their objections.179 By allowing the bankruptcy judge to approve a plan that is 
feasible and fair, Chapter 9 can inhibit the holdout creditor’s desire to get more out 
of the debtor than what it is actually entitled to.180 A close look at several recent 
municipal bankruptcies shows, however, that Chapter 9 may not be effective at 
getting the holdout creditor under control. 
In the Detroit bankruptcy, the fight with holdout creditors Financial Guaranty 
Insurance Company and Syncora Guarantee Inc. generated high fees that Detroit 
                                                 
177 Rex Sinquefield, Opinion, Stockton, CA: One of America’s Most Miserable Cities 
Just Got More Miserable, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
rexsinquefield/2013/04/05/stockton-ca-americas-most-miserable-city-just-got-a-lot-more-
miserable/ [http://perma.cc/97S5-NMB4]. Indeed, in its plan of adjustment, Stockton left its 
pensions untouched, likely because pension reform is politically unpopular. See Dale Kasler, 
Judge Approves Stockton’s Plan to Repay Creditors, Leaving Pensions Intact, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (Oct. 30, 2014, 1:03 PM) (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article3474893.html. 
178 PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY 
BANKRUPTCY 20 (1998), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_398OP.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4XTF-SRYW]. 
179 Wolfe, supra note 104, at 566. 
180 Buccola, supra note 18, at 592–93. 
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officials alleged the city could not pay.181 These creditors consistently fought against 
Detroit’s eligibility for bankruptcy, even going so far as to argue for dismissal of the 
case.182 Syncora even appealed a ruling about Detroit’s casino revenue all the way 
to the Sixth Circuit.183 The bankruptcy judge finally forced the two holdouts into 
mediation.184 Although the parties ultimately reached a deal with Detroit,185 the deal 
came at a high cost: Detroit’s legal fees and expenses in fighting these creditors rose 
to $26 million, while the cost of all professional services reported prior to the 
confirmation hearing was approximately $55 million.186 Detroit’s political leaders 
argued in court that they could not both pay the professional fees associated with 
their bankruptcy and improve services for residents.187 
Meanwhile in Stockton’s bankruptcy, Franklin Resources Inc. emerged as the 
lone holdout creditor. Franklin objected strenuously to Stockton’s plan, which 
purported to pay it a fraction of its investment.188 Although Stockton’s plan of 
adjustment was ultimately confirmed, city officials spent $16 million on costs 
associated with the bankruptcy.189 This represented 3% of Stockton’s annual 
operating budget for 2013-14 and well over the $12.5 million in the fund the city 
had set aside to pay for its bankruptcy.190 After Stockton emerged, the city was 
predicted to owe almost $48 million in settlements and other obligations.191 Even 
                                                 
181 Karen Pierog & Lisa Lambert, Price Tag for Detroit’s Bankruptcy Law Firm Hits 
$26 Million, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/ 
08/usa-detroit-bankruptcy-fees-idUSL1N0R922J20140908 [http://perma.cc/J2TN-TGT6]. 
182 Lisa Lambert, Hold-Out Creditor Argues for Dismissal of Detroit Bankruptcy Case, 
REUTERS (July 28, 2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-detroit-fgic-
idUSL2N0Q31CM20140728 [http://perma.cc/7MY5-BVUL]. 
183 Matthew Dolan, Creditors Win Bid to Challenge Detroit Bankruptcy, WALL STREET 
J. (July 3, 2014, 9:39 AM) (on file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/creditors-win-bid-to-challenge-detroit-bankruptcy-1404352068.  
184 Karen Pierog, Detroit, Hold-Out Creditors Must Go to Bankruptcy Mediation—
Judge, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/26/usa-
detroit-bankruptcysyncoraguarantee-idUSL1N0QW1H320140826 [http://perma.cc/Q66Y-
BAQT]. 
185 Karen Pierog & Lisa Lambert, Syncora, Detroit Reach Deal in Principle over City 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2014, 9:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/10 
/usa-detroit-bankruptcy-syncora-guarante-idUSL1N0RA31220140910 [http://perma.cc/XK 
F2-4LM3]. 
186 Pierog & Lambert, supra note 181. 
187 Melissa B. Jacoby, What Are the Costs of Detroit’s Rise from Bankruptcy?, 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:45 AM), https://theconversation.com/what-are-the-costs-
of-detroits-rise-from-bankruptcy-34171 [http://perma.cc/CD7M-E6EA]. 
188 Roger Phillips, Stockton Bankruptcy Cost: More Than $41 Million, 
RECORDNET.COM (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:57 PM) (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.recordnet.com/article/20141028/NEWS/141029525 (noting that Franklin had 
received just over $4 million from Stockton as repayment for a $35 million loan). 
189 Id. 
190 See CITY OF STOCKTON, supra note 127, at A-1, A-7. 
191 Phillips, supra note 188. 
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then, Franklin threatened to appeal Stockton’s plan of adjustment and further 
prolong the case.192 
In San Bernardino, California, holdout unions impeded the city’s ability to 
create a plan of adjustment and even harmed the union members they are supposed 
to be helping. San Bernardino fought for years with its unions and with CalPERS. 
These fights slowed progress in the case: the city filed for bankruptcy in August 
2012 and had yet to file a plan of adjustment well over two years later.193 The slow 
progress of the talks took a particularly heavy toll on union members, because the 
unions could not fight pay cuts in the bankruptcy.194 As a result, some city 
firefighters began declaring personal bankruptcy.195 The bankruptcy judge even 
accused the unions of “stonewalling” negotiations after they attempted to sue the 
city in state court during the bankruptcy case.196 
Bankruptcy law offers an alternative to these long, drawn-out fights with 
holdout creditors: confirm a plan of adjustment over the holdout creditor’s objection. 
This so-called “cramdown power” is utilized extensively in Chapter 11 cases, but is 
practically nonexistent in Chapter 9. In Chapter 9, the plan eventually presented to 
the court is almost always a consensual one, reached after months or years of 
negotiations.197 Thus, Chapter 9 in effect often functions as a drawn-out settlement 
process. For example, in Detroit, the judicial mediator ordered the city and its major 
creditors to “keep talking until they come to an agreement.”198 By forcing the city to 
keep negotiating with creditors in lieu of allowing it to utilize the bankruptcy 
cramdown tool, the mediator took away one of the key benefits of municipal 
bankruptcy. 
Why is the cramdown option almost never exercised in Chapter 9? The answer 
may stem from the uncertainty of how to apply the cramdown requirements in a 
municipal bankruptcy case. For example, a plan that is crammed down may not 
                                                 
192 Robin Respaut, Stockton, California, Bankruptcy Judge Denies Motion to Stall Plan, 
REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/usa-
stockton-idUSL1N0US1MK20150120 [ https://perma.cc/HB5B-TNDW]. 
193 Tim Reid, Judge in San Bernardino Bankruptcy Losing Patience with City, Calpers, 




196 Steven Church, San Bernardino Judge Accuses Fire Union of ‘Stonewalling’ 
Negotiations, 26 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 1025, 1033 (2014). 
197 Although the judge in the City of Stockton’s bankruptcy confirmed a plan over the 
objection of a holdout creditor, the holdout creditor was within a class of creditors that voted 
to approve the plan, meaning that the usual cramdown requirements for plan confirmation 
did not apply. See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law at 17–18, In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 12-
32118-C-9).  
198 Karen Pierog & Lisa Lambert, Detroit End in Sight as Deals Leave FGIC Last Major 
Bankruptcy Holdout, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2014, 6:08 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-idUSKBN0H72IN20140912 
[http://perma.cc/K2K5-GCNQ]. 
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discriminate unfairly against a class of claims that does not accept the plan.199 Courts 
that have applied this standard in Chapter 9 have done so inconsistently, leading 
scholars to question whether they are complying with the standard.200 Creditors 
objecting to a plan may also argue that the plan fails to meet the “best interests of 
creditors” test, which in Chapter 11 requires creditors to receive as much as they 
would if the debtor’s plan were converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.201 In a Chapter 
9 case, where liquidation is not an option, courts struggle with how to decide whether 
a plan in fact meets the best interests test.202 These uncertainties in plan confirmation 
standards in turn may make a debtor’s plan susceptible to challenges, even once it is 
confirmed.203 
In the absence of Chapter 9, the holdout creditor could theoretically never come 
to the bargaining table at all. Still, when judges hesitate to utilize cramdown, and 
instead force parties to mediate (or litigate), Chapter 9 becomes more costly and 
difficult than it needs to be. If the application of Chapter 11-based cramdown rules 
is too uncertain, perhaps Chapter 9 needs its own set of rules.204 
Bankruptcy is typically described as a collective process.205 In Chapter 9, this 
process becomes a tug-of-war. Highly publicized battles rage between the debtor 
and one or two holdout creditors. These battles are not mere hypotheticals; in fact, 
the bankruptcy judge in Detroit explicitly asked the city and one of its holdout 
                                                 
199 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012); see also Gary L. Kaplan, Understanding the Rules 
of Bankruptcy Cramdown, LAW360 (Sept. 4, 2013, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/468678/understanding-the-rules-of-bankruptcy-cramdown 
[http://perma.cc/97N3-L9TS] (explaining that the rules of bankruptcy cramdown do not 
allow for unfair discrimination). 
200 See Hynes & Walt, supra note 148, at 19–23 (noting that courts applying the unfair 
discrimination standard in Chapter 9 have used it to favor retirees over other creditors, 
potentially contravening bankruptcy law). 
201 Bret A. Maidman, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: An Overview, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/chapter-11-bankruptcy-overview.html [http:// 
perma.cc/3MH5-VN35] (last visited Dec. 2, 2015). 
202 David A. Skeel, Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER 
L.J. 121, 142–43 (2015) (noting that the “best interest of the creditors” test is unclear because 
“liquidation is not an option for a municipal debtor”). 
203 See, e.g., Nathan Bomey, A Few Retirees Still Fighting Detroit Bankruptcy Plan, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/ 
detroit-bankruptcy/2015/01/08/detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-pension-cuts/21445939/ [http:// 
perma.cc/8KFW-77EP]. 
204 See Hynes & Walt, supra note 148, at 31–32 (arguing that the reason Stockton’s 
holdout creditor objected so strenuously was related to problems with interpreting the unfair 
discrimination standard in municipal bankruptcy); Skeel, supra note 202, at 144 (“[T]he 
precise contours of unfair discrimination [in the Chapter 9 context] are unsettled.”). 
205 See, e.g., Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
381, 408 (2015); Skeel, supra note 41, at 2233 (“[Bankruptcy] is collective in nature. A 
bankruptcy framework adjusts the debtor’s relationship with most or all of its 
creditors . . . . ”). 
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creditors to stop using war analogies to describe their disagreements.206 In the 
meantime, taxpayers and employees are left to suffer as the city’s attention and effort 
become consumed with dragging the holdouts to the bargaining table at any cost in 
order to eke out a few concessions. Although holdout creditors exist in the Chapter 
11 context, the ability of the court to play a more significant role in a Chapter 11 
case, and in particular the debtor’s well-defined ability to exercise the cramdown 
power, limit the extent to which holdout creditors can wage war on the Chapter 11 
debtor. 
Although holdout creditors may eventually settle with municipal debtors, they 
are central players that inflict substantial harms during the life of a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy. Just as they do with eligibility battles, holdout creditors at the plan 
confirmation stage can wage an all-consuming war on debtors that diverts resources 
away from debtor rehabilitation. Thus, although Chapter 9 may eventually drive 
parties to settlement,207 it is not clear that such settlement maximizes value for the 
debtor, the creditors, or taxpayers. Instead, the very structure of Chapter 9 allows 
holdout creditors to use the bankruptcy process to dig in their heels until the last 
possible second, dragging out a painful and expensive case for months or even years. 
Despite Chapter 9’s aim to resolve the holdout creditor problem, a holdout creditor’s 
power in a Chapter 9 case is substantial. 
 
6.  The Aftermath of Chapter 9 
 
Due to the problems with utilizing Chapter 9, cities and towns emerging from 
bankruptcy may find themselves financially worse off than they were prior to filing 
for bankruptcy. In fact, municipalities that have filed for Chapter 9 may return to 
insolvency within just a few years of filing.208 Although courts are required to 
determine that a municipality’s plan of adjustment is feasible prior to confirming the 
plan,209 cities that have emerged from bankruptcy often struggle to provide even 
basic services after their bankruptcy exit, indicating that judicial findings of 
feasibility may be inaccurate. Multiple examples illustrate this point. 
The city of Vallejo, California emerged from Chapter 9 in 2011, but is still 
mired in pension debt and struggling to provide basic public services, in direct 
contrast with the core purpose of Chapter 9.210 According to Vallejo’s city manager, 
                                                 
206 Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge to Consider Sanctions for Syncora 
Attorneys, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 25, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/detroit/2014/08/25/detroit-bankruptcy-judge-to-consider-sanctions-
for-syncora-attorneys-/14532517/ [https://perma.cc/9ZE9-B2GU]. 
207 C. Scott Pryor, Stockton Status, PRYOR THOUGHTS (Oct. 14, 2013), 
http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/search?q=stockton+status [http://perma.cc/LS9Z-EJ2T]. 
208 Kishfy, supra note 14, at 362. 
209 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). 
210 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (“[T]he 
legislative purpose underlying [Chapter 9] . . . is to allow an insolvent municipality to 
restructure its debts in order to continue to provide public services.”). 
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the city’s police department remains “woefully understaffed.”211 Even while it was 
in bankruptcy, Vallejo was unable to borrow money to maintain its streets or replace 
police or fire vehicles.212 After the city cut its police and fire forces by nearly 50%, 
incidences of violent crime rose.213 Although Chapter 9 helped the city save $34 
million through debt adjustments and rejection of labor agreements, Vallejo spent 
over $13 million on legal fees related to the bankruptcy proceeding.214 After 
emerging from bankruptcy, Vallejo was unable to access the debt markets to obtain 
additional funding because, despite its financial reorganization, it still could not 
afford to pay for interest on loans.215 A post-bankruptcy analysis confirmed that 
because Vallejo had not been able to significantly reduce labor costs, a key goal of 
its bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy had been unsuccessful.216 Today, Vallejo 
remains “beset by poverty, gangs and crime.”217 As one commentator put it, anyone 
looking at Vallejo’s bankruptcy “has to question a process that takes three years to 
complete and results in confirmation of a plan of adjustment that leaves the city with 
a $3.4 million dollar shortfall in its first post-bankruptcy budget.”218 In the end, 
Vallejo’s condition got worse, not better, after its bankruptcy filing.219 
Jefferson County, Alabama remains under court oversight as it struggles with 
debt in the aftermath of its bankruptcy. Although Jefferson County emerged from 
bankruptcy in 2013, a group of local residents and leaders have continued to fight to 
void parts of the county’s bankruptcy plan.220 The group has filed a federal lawsuit 
against Jefferson County, arguing that a sewer rate increase included in the county’s 
plan treats residents unfairly and places the county’s most vulnerable residents at 
                                                 
211 Melanie Hicken, Once Bankrupt, Vallejo Still Can’t Afford Its Pricey Pensions, 
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in_local_government_financial_distress.pdf [https://perma.cc/972Q-8ADT]. 
213 Id. 
214 Id.; see also Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL STREET J. 
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218 Denniston, supra note 102, at 273. 
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risk.221 In court, representatives of the group have also argued that the city’s debt 
adjustment plan has increased, rather than decreased, the county’s overall debt.222 
The County is also facing litigation over whether the bankruptcy court’s authority 
to oversee sewer rates is constitutional.223 Thus, Jefferson County continues to fight 
legal, political, and financial battles224 even after emerging from Chapter 9, and 
questions remain over whether the county’s plan treated creditors in accordance with 
bankruptcy law.225 
A post-bankruptcy policy analysis for Orange County, California concluded 
that the county remained vulnerable years after its exit from bankruptcy. The report 
determined that the bankruptcy had disproportionately affected the county’s poor: 
“[t]heir services were cut during the bankruptcy” and had not, even two years after 
emergence, “been fully restored.”226 The report also concluded that by filing for 
bankruptcy, Orange County had ruined its credit, worsened relations with other local 
governments, and had “painted itself into a corner” in order to repay those 
governments.227 In other words, rather than strengthening Orange County’s financial 
condition, the municipal bankruptcy process had created challenges, making it 
difficult for the county to succeed financially. 
Although it has not yet emerged from bankruptcy, San Bernardino, California, 
which has spent over three years in Chapter 9, recently defaulted on $10 million in 
bond payments228 and warned that it may have to contract out essential services to 
                                                 
221 Id. 
222 Id.; see also Chung, supra note 58, at 699 (noting that Jefferson County’s debt “has 
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226 PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., supra note 178, at 14. 
227 Id. at 16. Despite the report’s conclusion that Orange County’s credit had been hurt, 
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Payments, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015, 10:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/18/ 
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the county or state.229 The city is facing enormous pressure from its police and 
firefighter unions to produce a viable bankruptcy plan, and voters have rejected a 
ballot measure to reduce pay for police and firefighters.230 These events have left 
San Bernardino at an impasse in its bankruptcy case.231 Legal fees are projected to 
reach $10 million, representing nearly a quarter of the city’s budget deficit.232 San 
Bernardino’s impending inability to provide essential services is the opposite of the 
result Chapter 9 is supposed to help it achieve. 
It would be foolish to conclude that bankruptcy provides a solution to all of the 
problems affecting a city or town, and it would be equally foolish to suggest that the 
entities profiled above entered bankruptcy with the expectation that all of their 
problems would be resolved at no cost. Yet, the bankruptcy process has often served 
to root these municipalities more deeply into poor financial conditions. Bankruptcy 
is not preparing these entities for financial stability, and the examples above 
illustrate that municipalities that emerge from bankruptcy often have a difficult time 
resolving their problems and managing their debts.233 While they are in bankruptcy, 
these municipalities rack up substantial legal costs, diverting resources away from 
debt adjustment mechanisms and toward litigation with holdout creditors.  
Of course, part of the problem may lie not with the bankruptcy process itself 
but with the fact that municipalities cannot liquidate.234 A business in a Chapter 11 
case may liquidate, selling off its assets, if it is determined that the business will 
continue to struggle in the aftermath of a bankruptcy. Municipal entities, in contrast, 
usually continue to operate, even if rehabilitating them is disproportionately 
difficult. In certain cities, conditions may be so poor that it is impossible to 
rehabilitate the municipality without incurring significant collateral consequences. 
Although liquidation is not an option for cities, dissolution may be; however, a 
municipality must pay its debts before it can dissolve, and creditors cannot force a 
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city’s dissolution the way that they can force a business to liquidate.235 Although 
municipal bankruptcy is not currently seen as a complementary measure to 
municipal dissolution, perhaps it should be explored as such, given the difficulty of 
rehabilitating certain municipalities. 
In their classic article, When Cities Go Broke, Professors Michael McConnell 
and Randal Picker stated, “[t]he premise of municipal bankruptcy law is that the city 
will emerge from bankruptcy in the same form—with the same boundaries, 
resources, functions, and governing structure—with which it entered bankruptcy.”236 
It has now been over twenty years since that article’s publication, and the cities and 
towns that have filed during that time illustrate that municipal bankruptcy fails to 
meet this basic premise. Although a city that emerges from bankruptcy these days 
may arguably retain its boundaries, its resources have often taken a dramatic hit, and 
the functions and services it once provided may no longer be readily available. 
As the examples in this Article illustrate, cities and towns that enter Chapter 9 
pay a large sum of money and expend a lot of resources to adjust only some of their 
debts and to engage in an expensive tug-of-war with holdout creditors and contract 
counterparties. In the end, many of these municipalities are still mired in financial 
and structural trouble upon emerging from bankruptcy,237 whether due to unresolved 
debt or pension issues, political problems, or new debts from legal fees incurred 
during the bankruptcy.238 For these entities, Chapter 9 functions as bankruptcy 
without bite, a costly and time-consuming process that fails to meet its basic goals. 
To quote one practitioner, “it remains unclear whether Chapter 9 is an effective tool 
to comprehensively restructure municipal bond debt.”239 Although defenders 
continue to rally around Chapter 9 as the last best option for struggling 
municipalities, the outcomes for cities that have utilized Chapter 9 should lead 
policymakers to question whether the current system makes sense and how it might 
be improved. 
                                                 
235 Id. at 1381–82. 
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B.  A Failure of Bankruptcy Law 
 
Chapter 9 contravenes many of the broader goals of bankruptcy law. Chapter 
9’s wide application to entities from a sewer district to an entire county makes it 
difficult for courts to develop uniform rules and workable precedent to apply in 
municipal bankruptcy. The lack of clear rules in turn prevents Chapter 9 from 
providing the predictable, orderly approach to restructuring that bankruptcy law is 
supposed to embody.240 Sparse relevant case law, combined with unclear standards 
for eligibility and confirmation,241 makes Chapter 9 difficult to use as a bankruptcy 
tool and can even lead to confusion when the municipality is initially developing its 
funding sources and debt issuances.242 
Chapter 9 is an overextension of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, one that is asserted to 
address problems, such as political instability and governance issues, that 
bankruptcy was never designed or intended to address. On a practical level, the 
cumbersome interplay between state authorization and federal law creates eligibility 
and confirmation hurdles that make municipal bankruptcy cases difficult to 
administer.243 
Although both Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 are designed to achieve basic 
bankruptcy outcomes, the chapter-specific incentives leading to those outcomes are 
very different. As discussed above, municipalities cannot be liquidated in a 
bankruptcy and must continue to provide vital health and safety services to their 
citizens.244 In contrast, citizens do not typically rely on corporations for the provision 
of health and safety services, and corporations may be liquidated if it is determined 
that the corporation is no longer valuable as a going concern. These differences drive 
the different goals underlying each chapter. Chapter 11 exists to maximize the value 
of the entity utilizing it; Chapter 9 exists so that a municipality may survive.245 
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Modeling the bulk of Chapter 9 on a Bankruptcy Code section aimed at fulfilling 
different purposes for different types of entities makes little sense. 
Although the purposes of Chapter 11 and Chapter 9 are vastly different, both 
chapters are designed to embody bankruptcy’s ability to carry out key functions, 
such as contract modification, elimination of debt overhang, and overcoming the 
holdout creditor.246 The Chapter 11 toolkit largely achieves these functions in the 
Chapter 11 context. Chapter 9, however, needs different tools to achieve these same 
results, tools that are lacking in Chapter 9’s current incarnation.247 
This does not mean that a federal bankruptcy option is useless for 
municipalities. In fact, there may be great value in allowing municipalities to take 
advantage of federal bankruptcy law.248 Alternatives to Chapter 9, such as bailouts 
or state financial distress programs, often either do not work, leaving cities to 
struggle for years,249 or, in the case of bailouts, work too well, possibly creating 
incentives for cities to be lax in their financial monitoring.250 Furthermore, only 
federal law can provide for nonconsensual contract modification,251 and in other 
contexts, bankruptcy law has succeeded in achieving the objectives outlined above. 
Unfortunately, Chapter 9 in its current form simply does not serve the purposes that 
bankruptcy law was designed to fulfill. 
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indebtedness . . . may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition . . . .”). 
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A key principle of bankruptcy law is the fair and equitable treatment of 
creditors’ claims.252 In Chapter 9, however, it is admittedly difficult to figure out 
how to achieve this treatment. Unlike in a business case, where the relative priorities 
of secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders are generally 
established, in a Chapter 9 case, the priorities are not so clear.253 Concerns about 
who should bear most of the risk of a Chapter 9 debtor’s nonpayment continue to 
dominate discussions in both scholarly literature and in case law.254 The law is also 
in flux about when a municipality must attempt to raise revenues (for example, by 
                                                 
252 See Hynes & Walt, supra note 150, at 613 (“Bankruptcy law begins with the 
principle of an equal distribution among creditors . . . .”); Skeel, supra note 23, at 703 (“But 
the principle of equal treatment of similarly situated creditors is deeply entrenched, and 
bankruptcy law is designed to encourage a fair distribution of the sacrifice.”). 
253 For example, in Detroit’s bankruptcy case, the city’s proposal to pay its retirees more 
than its bond investors was contested by bond insurers who argued that such a distribution 
would be illegal. See Steven Church, Detroit Bond Insurer Says Plan Causes ‘Serious 
Mayhem,’ BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2014, 11:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
09-03/detroit-bond-insurer-says-plan-causes-serious-mayhem-.html [https://perma.cc/U3Y 
Q-AQQJ]. The bankruptcy judge was tasked with deciding this issue as part of his 
determination as to whether Detroit’s plan was “fair and feasible.” Id.; see also B. Summer 
Chandler, Is It “Fair” to Discriminate in Favor of Pensioners in a Chapter 9 Plan?, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2014, at 22, 22 (discussing the issue of whether a plan of adjustment 
may be approved if it provides a greater recovery to pensioners compared with recoveries 
offered to other creditors of the same priority); Steven Church, San Bernardino Sued for 
Favoring Pensions over Bondholders, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2015, 8:46 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-08/san-bernardino-sued-for-favoring-
pensions-over-bondholders-1- [http://perma.cc/THV8-NP48] (describing the lawsuit against 
San Bernardino for continuing to pay the state’s retirement system without giving equal 
treatment to pension bondholders); Dawson, supra note 245, at 7 (noting that there are no 
priority unsecured claims in municipal bankruptcy other than administrative expense 
claims). 
254 For example, in the City of Stockton’s bankruptcy case, the judge confirmed 
Stockton’s plan of adjustment even though it contemplated paying retirees a greater share of 
what they were owed than other creditors. See Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves 
Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Calif., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014, 3:35 PM) (on file with the 
Utah Law Review), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/judge-approves-bankruptcy-
exit-for-stockton-calif/. Prioritizing retirees in this manner is not clearly contemplated by the 
Bankruptcy Code, and some scholars thus believe that the Stockton plan is bad bankruptcy 
law. See C. Scott Pryor, BIG News from Stockton. Maybe., PRYOR THOUGHTS (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/2014/10/big-news-from-stockton-maybe.html [http:// 
perma.cc/Z99P-QNVK]; C. Scott Pryor, Stockton Confirmed!, PRYOR THOUGHTS (Oct. 31, 
2014), http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/2014/10/stockton-confirmed.html?utm_source 
=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PryorThoughts+%28Pryor
+Thoughts%29 [http://perma.cc/42FW-HKHJ]; see also Romy Varghese, California Issuers 
Risk Higher Costs with Stockton: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22 2014, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-22/california-issuers-risk-higher-costs-with-
stockton-muni-credit.html [http://perma.cc/89K8-9X9M] (noting that, because Stockton’s 
plan paid certain investors less than they were owed, other California localities may see 
borrowing costs rise). 
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taxing) before it can impose cuts on its creditors and whether a municipality that 
seeks to impair one group of creditors must treat other creditors similarly.255 
Uncertain outcomes in Chapter 9 may give municipalities an incentive to settle with 
creditors instead of allowing a court to decide the issue.256 These settlements have 
the advantage of allowing the municipality to avoid cramming down a plan over the 
objections of creditors. Yet, the settlements impose their own costs by decreasing 
the amount of assets available to be split among the remaining creditors. 
Furthermore, if Chapter 9 becomes simply about forcing parties to settle, the 
municipality must pay a heavy entrance fee to those settlement negotiations in the 
form of the eligibility battle that is almost certain to occur at the start of the Chapter 
9 case.257 
The basic dichotomy between economic and financial distress further illustrates 
the difficulty with using Chapter 11 rules in Chapter 9. The economic/financial 
distress dichotomy is used in bankruptcy literature predominantly to distinguish 
between two types of financial distress facing corporations.258 Economic distress 
results when a corporation’s operating expenses are consistently higher than its 
revenues, while financial distress occurs when a corporation faces a short-term 
inability to pay back debts. Bankruptcy may be seen as an ineffective mechanism 
for combating economic distress, but as an effective mechanism for dealing with 
financial distress. This is because bankruptcy may do little to address the underlying, 
operational problems of an economically distressed entity, but bankruptcy can help 
remedy a short-term debt problem by eliminating these debt obligations and 
allowing the entity to continue to function as a going concern. 
In the municipal context, however, a municipality’s economic and financial 
problems are often inextricably intertwined.259 A municipality’s financial situation 
is very often governed by the same substantive laws, policies, and procedures by 
which the municipality itself is governed. If bankruptcy is a tool to predominantly 
address financial distress, other mechanisms will be necessary in every municipal 
case to address the causes of the municipality’s economic distress. Chapter 9 on its 
own cannot provide this remedy.260 Further, a municipality’s economic and financial 
problems are in turn intertwined with state and federal problems. Unlike a business, 
                                                 
255 Lee R. Bogdanoff, Understanding Chapter 9 in Today’s Economic Environment, in 
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 49 (2011). 
256 B. Summer Chandler & Mark S. Kaufman, Maybe Taxes Aren’t So Certain: What 
Is “Fair and Equitable” in a Chapter 9 Plan?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2013, at 12, 13. 
257 See supra section II.B. 
258 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 41, at 2235 (“[T]here is a well recognized distinction 
between economic failure (a firm should be shuttered) and financial failure (liabilities exceed 
assets).”). 
259 See supra section III.A.4.  
260 See, e.g., Alison Vekshin & Michael Bathon, Stockton’s Costly Bankruptcy May Not 
Tempt Other Cities, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2014, 10:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-31/stockton-s-costly-bankruptcy-may-not-
tempt-other-cities.html [http://perma.cc/9H9V-JYTS] (noting that Stockton’s exit from 
bankruptcy “doesn’t change the difficult economic environment”). 
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a municipality is never truly a discrete entity—it is always a creature of the state 
and/or federal government. 
In short, although Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 share some key bankruptcy 
purposes, such as resolution of the holdout creditor problem261 and the elimination 
of debt overhang,262 Chapter 9 needs a vastly different toolkit to achieve those goals. 
In theory, Chapter 9 was designed to help struggling municipalities regain their 
footing by imbuing them with greater powers. But in practice, Chapter 9’s use of 
Chapter 11’s tools brings together a group of seriously weakened agents. To move 
forward, it is necessary to articulate and clarify the role federal bankruptcy law 
should play in municipal distress, establish a new toolkit for municipal debtors, and 
clearly delineate the roles various intertwined entities—municipalities, states, and 
the federal government—should play in alleviating municipal financial distress.263 
 
IV.  MOVING FORWARD 
 
Discussed previously, Parts II and III illustrate that Chapter 9’s toolkit, modeled 
off of Chapter 11, fails to achieve the aims of bankruptcy generally and those of 
Chapter 9 in particular. Instead of adapting Chapter 9 as each new municipal crisis 
unfolds, the time is ripe to focus on holistic reform. If federal bankruptcy is to remain 
an option for municipalities, the structure of Chapter 9 must be reconsidered. 
Using the analysis from Parts II and III, Part IV suggests several starting points 
for Chapter 9 reform, each seeking to align Chapter 9 with bankruptcy law and make 
Chapter 9 more effective as a bankruptcy tool.264 Section A identifies three broad 
                                                 
261 See Kimhi, supra note 16, at 357, 363–65; see also To Amend the Bankruptcy Act 
Municipal and Private Corporations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d 
Cong. 22 (1933) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox) (“In every instance where a 
governmental unit finds itself in financial difficulty and is able to make some satisfactory 
agreement of adjustment with the majority of its creditors, there is always a small minority 
who hold out and demand preferential treatment. These minority creditors are prompted in 
this action by the thought that someone will buy them out rather than have the whole plan 
collapse.”); McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 454 (“Municipal bankruptcy law thus 
originated from a desire to control minority holdouts, and arose in a context of substantial 
uncertainty over the appropriate relationship between federal and state law. These issues still 
resonate in the current Chapter 9.”). 
262 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, An Ex Ante Approach to Excessive State Debt, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 235, 272 (2014) (“Chapter 9 is thus oriented toward a singular function—the elimination 
of debt overhang.”); see also Skeel, supra note 23, at 687 (“[B]ankruptcy may also be 
necessary to solve a debt overhang problem.”). 
263 See generally Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PA. ST. L. 
REV. 647, 695 (2014) (observing that state boundary laws may contribute to central city 
financial instability and suggesting that boundary policies be reconsidered in the course of a 
municipal bankruptcy). 
264 As a starting point, this Article accepts the idea that federal bankruptcy is an option 
that can and should be available for municipalities. The options described in this Part are 
designed to realign Chapter 9 with federal bankruptcy principles and goals and are not meant 
to be wholesale replacements for the federal bankruptcy process. 
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areas of focus for reform: a holistic re-design of Chapter 9 so that it is no longer an 
offshoot of Chapter 11; reconsideration of the balance between federal relief and 
state sovereignty; and new roles for taxpayers, the region, and the state. Section B 
provides guidance on the timing and use of these reforms, cautioning that even with 
the advocated reforms, municipal relief should be tailored whenever possible to 
account for the broad scope of problems different municipal entities could face. 
 
A.  Overhaul and Reform 
 
Reforming Chapter 9 outright poses many challenges. Many of the reforms that 
would give Chapter 9 more clout as a bankruptcy mechanism, such as allowing the 
judge to play a greater role in the case, appointing a trustee to manage the case, or 
giving debtors the ability to renegotiate more types of debt, would run afoul of state 
sovereignty concerns.265 Although granting the bankruptcy court more power to, for 
example, sell property or raise taxes, would certainly provide more opportunity for 
creditor involvement in the bankruptcy case, any move toward increasing federal 
power in municipal bankruptcy is likely to meet with great resistance due to the 
concerns discussed above over federal intrusion into state sovereignty.266 Proposals 
to allow bankruptcy to give municipalities a true fresh start by allowing for 
reincorporation or the drawing of new boundary lines, for example, raise similar 
concerns. 
It is also difficult to reform Chapter 9 because municipalities must continue to 
provide essential services to their constituents even while they are in bankruptcy. 
This requirement means that many typical bankruptcy benefits, such as the breathing 
space provided by the automatic stay,267 will likely remain diminished regardless of 
how Chapter 9 is changed. Furthermore, given a municipality’s inevitable political 
interactions, federal bankruptcy is likely to remain an incomplete remedy in the 
municipal context, since bankruptcy is ill-equipped to address political problems. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties should not prevent reforms where reform is 
possible to increase predictability and consistency with bankruptcy law. There are 
three primary areas of focus for future reform: (1) providing Chapter 9 its own 
toolkit; (2) redefining the balance between state sovereignty and federal bankruptcy 
law; and (3) establishing new roles for the key players in a municipal bankruptcy. 
Each of these areas is described in greater detail below. 
  
                                                 
265 See supra section II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s views in the Ashton and 
Bekins cases regarding potential Tenth Amendment problems with giving other parties power 
to interfere with the states). 
266 See Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1023 (reviewing various proposals designed to 
increase the power of the bankruptcy court and suggesting that such proposals would likely 
be “‘dead on arrival’ at Congress”). 
267 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
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1.  Redesign 
 
The first area of focus should be redesigning Chapter 9 as its own independent 
form of bankruptcy relief. Bankruptcy law serves valuable purposes, but Chapter 9 
needs its own set of rules to achieve those purposes. As described above, the entities 
Chapter 9 is designed to help look very different from the entities for which Chapter 
11 was created. Nevertheless, Chapter 9 is based primarily off of Chapter 11. It 
makes little sense for Chapter 11 to serve as the baseline for Chapter 9.268 Although 
a complete overhaul of Chapter 9 will require extensive study, this Article’s 
examination of how Chapter 11 principles have failed to work in Chapter 9 suggests 
clear areas of focus for concrete modification of Chapter 9. The following broad 
proposals are meant to provide guidance and starting points to consider for reform. 
In redesigning Chapter 9, specific focus should be placed on developing rules 
that clarify current areas of confusion. This is particularly true with respect to plan 
confirmation rules, such as those concerning feasibility and cramdown. Judges 
should not have to rely on their “conscience,” as the judge in Detroit’s bankruptcy 
did,269 to articulate what makes a plan of adjustment feasible and fair in the Chapter 
9 context, nor should they have to rely on standards from Chapter 11 that are 
confusing when applied to Chapter 9. A new focus on development of Chapter 9-
specific standards should make judges more comfortable cramming down a plan 
over the objections of creditors. Establishment of Chapter 9-specific rules should 
also provide more clarity about the priority of claims in Chapter 9 and whether and 
how municipal contracts can be modified. 
A consequence of strengthening municipalities’ relief under Chapter 9 is the 
effect on borrowing costs for municipalities. If municipal debtors can more easily 
cram down a plan over objections, for example, concerned creditors may increase 
the cost of borrowing for municipalities. Although further study into whether and 
how proposed changes to Chapter 9 affect borrowing costs is certainly warranted, 
under the current situation, municipalities that have gone through Chapter 9 
bankruptcy face the prospect of both ineffective relief and higher borrowing costs. 
If the bankruptcy process can be used to put a municipality on firmer footing, 
increasing the municipality’s long-term stability and control over its debts, perhaps 
future borrowing costs will not be as high. 
Any redesign of Chapter 9 should also consider utilizing separate rules and 
procedures for special-purpose municipal entities. These entities, which include 
school, hospital, water, and sewer districts, look very different in form and structure 
from general-purpose municipalities, such as the cities, towns, and counties that 
                                                 
268 Indeed, some scholars have even noted that municipal bankruptcy is more akin to 
individual bankruptcy than business bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 14, at 292 
(“The effect is that municipal bankruptcy serves as a mechanism by which localities can 
obtain the equivalent of the fresh start available to individuals in bankruptcy, rather than the 
‘efficient reconfiguration of assets’ characteristic of corporate bankruptcy.”). 
269 Rochelle & Toub, supra note 241, at 1600.  
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have served as this Article’s focus. To the extent possible, Chapter 9 relief should 
be tailored so that each municipal entity utilizes procedures that take into account 
the structure, purpose, and creditors of each individual entity type. Of course, 
additional tailoring increases the information costs associated with operating under 
the rules, but when entities are so vastly different, it is worth considering whether 
Chapter 9 might simply be broken down into broad categories, with different rules 
applying for general-purpose and special-purpose entities.270 
A potential consequence of a holistic redesign of Chapter 9 is that the “new” 
Chapter 9 may be more difficult for bankruptcy judges to administer. Currently, 
Chapter 9’s similarity to Chapter 11 may appeal to bankruptcy judges, many of 
whom only rarely encounter municipal bankruptcies. It will take time for bankruptcy 
judges to learn about, use, and develop law in the “new” Chapter 9, possibly 
increasing unpredictability and instability in the law in the short term. Still, these 
difficulties are not insurmountable. The Bankruptcy Code as a whole is constantly 
undergoing scrutiny and reform. In fact, a recent proposal would substantially 
change the Chapter 11 process.271 The possibility that any proposed changes will 
slow the law’s development in the short term should be balanced against the need to 
have a system that can meet the goals it is designed to accomplish. 
 
2.  A Better Balance 
 
A second area of focus should be on redefining the precarious and uncertain 
balance between state sovereignty and federal bankruptcy law that currently shapes 
Chapter 9. One way to do this is to focus on eligibility battles. Under the current 
system, a municipality must jump through two primary hurdles to receive access to 
Chapter 9 relief: it must receive state authorization to file for bankruptcy, and it must 
then meet all of the federal bankruptcy requirements for eligibility.272 As 
demonstrated, this process creates costly litigation battles that municipalities must 
fight before they can access bankruptcy relief. One possibility for streamlining a 
                                                 
270 A similar proposal has been made in the Chapter 11 context, to better account for 
the differences between larger and smaller entities. See AKIN GUMP, AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (ABI) REFORM COMMISSION RELEASES REPORT RECOMMENDING 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO CHAPTER 11, at 4 (2014), https://www.akingump.com/images/ 
content/3/4/v2/34347/American-Bankruptcy-Institute-ABI-Reform-Commission-Releases-
R.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVA5-C2XK] (describing the “creation of a new chapter 11 
paradigm for small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs)”). 
271 See generally AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 
11: 2012–2014 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014) (on file with the Utah Law 
Review), https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h (explaining proposals to 
change Chapter 11). 
272 See supra subsection II.B.1.  
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municipality’s path to relief could involve putting the eligibility process entirely in 
state hands.273 
Making the state the exclusive gatekeeper for Chapter 9 would still allow the 
state to “opt in” to federal bankruptcy relief for its municipalities. At the same time, 
eliminating the federal eligibility hurdles would make Chapter 9 more consistent 
with the goal of open access to bankruptcy court, while still respecting principles of 
state sovereignty. 
Eliminating federal eligibility requirements could also substantially reduce the 
overall cost to municipalities of the Chapter 9 proceeding. As seen above, federal 
eligibility battles usually take several months and eat up a large fraction of a 
municipality’s bankruptcy budget. Eliminating the federal eligibility requirements 
would mean that, while in bankruptcy, eligible debtors can more quickly focus their 
attention on developing a plan of adjustment and, ultimately, on getting back to 
work. In short, removing the federal eligibility hurdle could streamline the eligibility 
process without jeopardizing state sovereignty interests. 
A side effect of eliminating the federal eligibility requirements is the further 
diminishment of the role of creditors in a Chapter 9 case. As previously discussed, 
eligibility hearings represent one of the few opportunities for creditors to get 
involved in a municipal bankruptcy.274 Taking this opportunity away from creditors 
may make them more likely to hold out at the confirmation stage; however, the 
development of more powerful cramdown rules in the Chapter 9 context, as 
suggested above, may help alleviate this problem. 
Making the state the sole eligibility gatekeeper may also increase the role that 
state politics plays in municipal bankruptcy. A potential resolution to this issue is 
for states to create a special entity or agency to serve as a gatekeeper for state 
authorization. This agency could be composed of appointed bankruptcy experts 
within the state, rather than politicians. The presence of a more neutral entity could 
reduce the role of politics in eligibility proceedings, as discussed more fully below. 
Regardless of whether eligibility remains in federal hands or shifts entirely to 
the state, it is critical to recognize that Chapter 9 is only a partial solution to the 
problem of municipal fiscal distress. More research is needed to determine what 
exactly Chapter 9 does best in order to subsequently determine which entities—state, 
federal, or both—should play the role of Chapter 9 “gatekeeper.” 
 
3.  New Roles 
 
The third and final area of focus for reform should be on reexamining the roles 
of the various parties affected by a municipal bankruptcy. The range of focus 
includes (a) taxpayers, (b) state government, and (c) regional bodies.  
 
                                                 
273 This idea could be accomplished via statutory modification to Chapter 9. For 
example, the federal eligibility requirements could be reduced to one requirement, which 
makes municipalities eligible if their state specifically authorizes them to be. 
274 See supra notes 96–98.  
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(a)  Taxpayers 
 
Giving taxpayers a role to play in a Chapter 9 case as parties in interest would 
better align Chapter 9 with the due process ideal to allow parties affected by a case 
the ability to participate in that case.275 Allowing taxpayers in particular to intervene 
in a bankruptcy would also provide a counterpoint to those creditors whose primary 
interests lie not in keeping the municipality afloat but in getting paid at any cost.276 
By enabling a multitude of voices and perspectives to be heard, Chapter 9 may serve 
as a more effective tool for the municipality to raise arguments that may not 
otherwise be addressed in bankruptcy. 
The judge in Detroit recognized the importance of giving taxpayers a voice in 
municipal bankruptcy when he held a hearing to listen to nearly fifty Detroit 
residents who objected to Detroit’s bankruptcy filing.277 Although allowing taxpayer 
interests to dominate a case at the expense of creditors and the debtor may be 
counterproductive, giving taxpayers a formal avenue to participate in the case may 
allow key issues to come to light and is consistent with the goals of bankruptcy law 
and due process more generally.278 
The question of how much of a role to give taxpayers in the municipal 
bankruptcy process is worth further study.279 Giving taxpayers a direct vote on a 
municipality’s plan of adjustment may stall the process unnecessarily or make the 
case unmanageable. For example, taxpayers, particularly in places where the 
political climate disfavors taxation, could vote down plans that call for even modest 
tax increases. On the other hand, making taxpayers a class that can vote on a plan 
may be less of a concern if the bankruptcy judge can effectively enforce the debtor’s 
power to cram down an otherwise fair and feasible plan. 
Of course, taxpayers are arguably already represented in a bankruptcy case 
through the municipal officials that they have elected to represent their interests. 
Still, when a community is in the midst of a bankruptcy that can drastically affect 
                                                 
275 See Coordes, supra note 205, at 408. 
276 Similarly, the interests of taxpayers are often not aligned with the interests of 
officials. See Moberg & Wagner, supra note 55, at 33 (“In a municipal corporation, . . . the 
officials deciding how to spend the money are not guided by the incentive to maximize the 
value of their investments on behalf of their residents.”). 
277 Nathan Bromey & Matt Helms, Citizen Objectors to Detroit Bankruptcy Get Day in 
Court, USATODAY (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2013/09/19/detroit-bankruptcy-citizens-hearing/2839913/ [https://perma.cc/3FCH-KT35]. 
278 See Coordes, supra note 205, at 387–88 (making a similar argument for greater 
stakeholder participation in large Chapter 11 cases). 
279 At least one scholar has already begun to formulate theories about the propriety and 
degree of taxpayer involvement in a Chapter 9 case. See generally C. Scott Pryor, Who Bears 
the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal Residents in Chapter 9, 37 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 161 (2015) (providing that a committee should represent residents for the purposes 
of Chapter 9 plans); C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer 
Participation in Chapter 9, 24 WIDENER L.J. 81 (2015) (explaining how bankruptcy courts 
can address procedural and structural barriers to resident participation in Chapter 9 plans). 
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the living conditions of its residents, giving taxpayers the opportunity to explain for 
themselves how the bankruptcy will affect them will enhance the ability of 
representatives to address constituent concerns. Furthermore, giving taxpayers a 
voice may prevent some taxpayers from “voting with their feet” and simply leaving 
the municipality altogether. Thus, while the level of taxpayer participation in a 
municipal bankruptcy case need not rise to the point of giving them a direct vote on 
the plan, providing a formal avenue for taxpayers to communicate directly with the 
bankruptcy judge and officials involved in the bankruptcy would have significant 
benefits. 
 
(b)  States 
 
States may also have a greater role to play in a Chapter 9 case; however, that 
role must be carefully considered. Scholars have argued that Chapter 9 is designed 
to work in conjunction with the state,280 and that state involvement is necessary for 
a municipality in distress.281 The importance of state involvement in Chapter 9 is 
further emphasized by the fact that in some cases, the holdout creditors in a Chapter 
9 case are not private creditors, but other governmental entities.282 For example, 
CalPERS, a state agency, has been a key holdout creditor in many California 
municipal bankruptcies. These governmental entities, far from helping bankrupt 
municipalities, exacerbate the bankruptcy process in their role as holdout creditors. 
State involvement in municipal fiscal distress might therefore involve increased 
awareness of the roles state agencies play in a Chapter 9 case and coordination so 
that these agencies help the municipalities they are intended to work with. 
State intervention into a municipality’s affairs has sometimes worked well. For 
example, scholars support an ex ante approach to state involvement, beginning with 
the time when the municipality is issuing debt.283 Some states, such as New York, 
have begun to move in this direction, requiring municipalities to report financial data 
                                                 
280 Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 403, 415–16 (2014). 
281 Id. at 415 (“The real governance vacuum in Chapter 9 emerges when the state fails 
to provide any direction for the financial rehabilitation of its cities.”); see also PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 212, at 4–6 (providing guidance to states about whether and 
how “to assist municipalities facing fiscal stress”); Kimhi, supra note 59, at 637 (arguing that 
“state intervention is the most effective remedy for local financial crises”); Jones, supra note 
109 (“States have an obligation to monitor what they have created.”).  
282 See Frank Shafroth, Municipal Bankruptcy & the Role of Intergovernmental 
Relations, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/municipal-bankruptcy-the-role-of-
intergovernmental-relations/ [https://perma.cc/UFS7-PY2B] (noting that California’s 
“actions in recent years . . . have only served to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate San 
Bernardino’s fiscal problems”). 
283 See Lessard & Ngo, supra note 140, at 399; see also Buccola, supra note 18, at 240 
(arguing in favor of an ex ante approach to state financial distress). 
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to the state comptroller on a regular basis.284 Elsewhere, North Carolina is 
considered a shining example of ex ante state involvement.285 North Carolina’s 
Local Government Commission reviews budgets and debt proposals from all of the 
state’s municipalities on a regular basis.286 When a review signals that a locality may 
be facing fiscal trouble, the state puts the locality on a watch list and imposes strict 
guidelines for funding deals.287 
Within Chapter 9 itself, state intervention has sometimes worked as well. The 
bankruptcy case of Central Falls, Rhode Island is often cited as an example of 
successful state involvement in municipal affairs.288 After the city of Central Falls 
asked to be put into receivership under state law, lawmakers quickly passed two 
different laws that preserved Central Falls’ ability to continue borrowing funds.289 
In contrast to many of the cities and towns profiled above, Central Falls emerged 
from bankruptcy in just over a year.290 The state’s prompt intervention is widely 
credited with Central Falls’ success. 
Yet, there is no guarantee that what has worked in Rhode Island or North 
Carolina will work in other states. Due to variances in political climates and voter 
attitudes, states may be hampered in their efforts to intervene, or they may not be 
able—or willing—to intervene at all. Although scholars and policymakers have 
touted North Carolina’s ex ante system for years, it is telling that other states have 
not adopted a similar system. In fact, some states have even moved in the opposite 
direction—the state of California, for example, has repeatedly demonstrated that it 
is not willing to provide oversight to most municipalities, either before or after the 
entity succumbs to distress.291 In 1995, the governor of California vetoed a bill that 
would have created a Local Area Bankruptcy Committee that would perform a 
monitoring role for municipalities and eventually decide on bankruptcy 
                                                 
284 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 212, at 23. 
285 Kimhi, supra note 59, at 679 (“North Carolina is considered a model state in terms 
of local government finance.”). 
286 State and Local Government: Local Government Commission, N.C. DEP’T STATE 
TREASURER, https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Pages/Local-Government-Commission.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7C8V-TJYY] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
287 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 212, at 34. 
288 Id. at 4–5. 
289 Hilary Russ, Central Falls, Rhode Island Bankruptcy: Plan Saves Tiny City but 
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authorization.292 The governor was concerned that the bill would inappropriately 
allow a state government instrument to “usurp” local authority.293 In other states, 
constituents may resist state involvement, believing that it is not the state’s 
responsibility to interfere in the municipality’s affairs.294 
Even in states where increasing state intervention is feasible, proactive state 
intervention may cause more harm than good if the state interferes without taking 
the necessary time to develop an understanding of the municipality and the root 
causes of its problems. This requires an investment of time and effort at the state 
level just to create intervention programs and guidelines. State actors may also fail 
to act independently or may be subject to some of the same political influences as 
municipal officials. State intervention may even have an adverse effect on incentives 
at the municipal level. For example, municipal decision makers who believe that 
they can rely on a state bailout or other state assistance may lack the incentives to 
proactively pursue restructuring alternatives or financial reform.295 
State intervention also comes at a cost. As states themselves face budgetary 
struggles, they may be disinclined to intervene in the affairs of their municipalities. 
Indeed, state budget problems may even contribute to the cause of municipal fiscal 
distress, as states struggling to meet their own budgets refuse to continue to fund or 
provide services to their cities and towns. Even if states do not provide direct 
monetary assistance to distressed municipalities, other forms of help, such as 
increased state-level monitoring, may divert resources and personnel away from 
addressing state-level responsibilities. Thus, although state intervention may 
certainly be beneficial, it is not clear that the state will be able to overcome 
countervailing reasons not to intervene. 
State intervention methods may themselves fail or be too little, too late. 
Although early state intervention has arguably served to prevent municipal 
bankruptcies in some states,296 intervention efforts have not always worked well. For 
example, despite the existence of strong state oversight,297 many New Jersey 
municipalities are facing a looming pension crisis and other fiscal difficulties that 
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may lead them to bankruptcy’s door.298 Additionally, although the state of Michigan 
regularly reviews local governments for signs of distress, it does not intervene until 
events indicating financial distress have already been triggered.299 This timing 
problem is exacerbated because the state is composed of diverse actors who can 
disagree about the appropriate level of involvement in municipal affairs, slowing 
down needed relief. For example, in New Jersey, State Senate President Stephen 
Sweeney recently criticized Governor Chris Christie for appointing an emergency 
manager for Atlantic City, pledging a “big fight” against any potential bankruptcy 
for the city.300 
In short, state intervention, though valuable, may also do more harm than good 
in certain circumstances.301 Nevertheless, given that local fiscal decisions often 
resonate on the state level, it is important for states to at least be aware of, if not 
involved in, local fiscal crises to the extent possible.302 Reforming Chapter 9 to 
provide for an explicit role for state involvement in municipal bankruptcy, however, 
may not be feasible given the existing variance in state involvement. At the federal 
level, standardizing a way to give states control over a municipality’s eligibility for 
bankruptcy may be the only feasible form of federally mandated state intervention.  
 
(c)  A Middle Ground: Regional Coordination 
 
Regional coordination mechanisms, either in conjunction with or in lieu of state 
intervention, may also have a role to play in a new Chapter 9. As seen in Detroit’s 
battle with its suburbs over the assets in the Detroit Institute of Arts museum, 
municipal fiscal issues may affect an entire region.303 Creating a regional fiscal 
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monitoring mechanism that could address fiscal inequalities and ensure that the 
municipalities in the region are acting in a fiscally responsible manner could serve 
to fill the gap if the state is unable or unwilling to intervene, or if voter attitudes 
disfavor state involvement.304 Of course, regional entities may still be subject to 
political pressures, which could lessen their effectiveness as problem solvers. 
Still, regional coordination in some form may be valuable because municipal 
bankruptcy is in fact regional—its effects frequently extend beyond the boundaries 
of the struggling entity. Regional solutions do not necessarily have to involve every 
nearby city or town. Instead, a broad swath of regional coordination opportunities 
should be considered, including public/private partnerships or even coalitions 
among neighboring states.305 These types of coalitions are consistent with the idea 
of bankruptcy as a collective process and may help decrease transaction costs and 
quickly effectuate relief. Sharing services with nearby jurisdictions should be 
considered, as collaborating with more affluent communities could in turn 
strengthen a municipal debtor’s fiscal health. 
An example of regional involvement having these positive effects is the city of 
Detroit’s creation of a regional water authority during its bankruptcy. A six-person 
board runs the new water authority, with appointments from the city, surrounding 
counties, and the state governor.306 The regional deal is being touted both for 
smoothing over relations between Detroit and its suburbs and for its ability to 
generate more revenue, as a bond sale from the authority would likely fetch higher 
rates than a bond sale from the city by itself.307 In short, although regional 
intervention in the municipal financial distress context is a relatively untested 
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concept, Detroit’s use of regional mechanisms illustrates the potential for regional 
solutions to become a very powerful tool in federal bankruptcy.308 
 
B.  Timing and Use 
 
In thinking about how to design and implement changes to Chapter 9, reformers 
must pay attention to the variances among the fiscal and political climates of states 
and their municipalities. Currently, Chapter 9 represents a one-size-fits-all solution 
to innumerable forms of crisis for a variety of municipal entities of all shapes and 
sizes. Chapter 9’s failure to account for these variations is a key shortcoming that 
must be remedied if it is to function as a viable form of relief. For example, any 
response to a municipal fiscal crisis must take into account the effects of state 
policies already in place that may constrain the municipality.309 
One way to incorporate flexibility into a new version of Chapter 9 is to consider 
timing. It is critical to determine when municipalities would be better off using state 
alternatives to bankruptcy instead of Chapter 9. Several states, such as Pennsylvania, 
have receivership programs designed to be utilized either before or in lieu of Chapter 
9.310 These state programs can provide more oversight mechanisms for 
municipalities but do not allow the municipalities to modify contracts on a 
nonconsensual basis.311 Because of these programs, municipalities may avoid filing 
for bankruptcy entirely, or they may delay filing, sometimes to their detriment.312 
Developing “triggers” for when a municipality should seek federal relief, as some 
states have already done for their state insolvency programs, could help 
municipalities access federal relief at a time when that relief is most likely to help 
them. 
Currently, some states, such as Louisiana and Michigan, erect so many hurdles 
to filing for Chapter 9 that it becomes impossible for the municipality to file for 
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bankruptcy until it is well beyond most traditional forms of help, while other states 
have no barriers to filing at all.313 In the latter states, municipalities that file for 
Chapter 9 run the risk that their filing will be thrown out by the court as premature. 
In both cases, debtors expend substantial upfront costs before their Chapter 9 cases 
see the light of day. Thus, part of the solution for reforming Chapter 9 may well lie 
in fixing the timing—recognizing when bankruptcy will best help the municipality 
and when other solutions will be more beneficial. Simply advocating for increased 
intervention at any level is useless if that intervention is too ill-timed to be of value. 
To help municipalities and states strike the right balance in terms of timing, 
states that erect barriers to filing for Chapter 9 could do more to ensure that those 
barriers take the form of bankruptcy experts rather than politicians. For example, 
one commentator has already suggested changing Louisiana’s approval process so 
that it is run by a neutral fiscal administrator rather than by the state’s elected Bond 
Commission.314 Other states with barriers to entry to Chapter 9 should consider 
modifying their approval processes so that more neutral bankruptcy experts are 
involved in the decision-making process at an earlier stage. By providing a more 
inclusive role for bankruptcy or municipal finance experts, states could alleviate the 
concern that the road to municipal bankruptcy is more a political than a fiscal 
process. For example, politicians may hesitate for too long to file for bankruptcy out 
of concern that they will face the blame for the city’s financial condition. 
Alternatively, politicians may jump into bankruptcy too soon, seeing it as the 
solution to all of their problems or, at the least, as a scapegoat for the criticisms 
leveled at them by their constituents. Importantly, these experts need not replace 
politicians, but giving experts an increased advisory role may help municipal 
officials better determine when seeking federal relief is appropriate. 
Even if increasing the role of expert advisors is not feasible, experts may be 
able to play a monitoring role. Increased monitoring at either the pre- or post-
bankruptcy level (or, preferably, at both points in time) may also help to alleviate 
many of the problems that currently characterize Chapter 9. Monitoring by a neutral 
bankruptcy expert may help reduce some of the politics and interest group pressures 
that can come into play, making it easier for the municipality to regain its footing 
post-bankruptcy. Increased monitoring can also help to shore up a municipality’s 
financial position, and post-bankruptcy monitoring in particular may even make the 
bankruptcy process cost justified for the municipality, as it continues to receive 
assistance in the form of advice and oversight after it emerges from Chapter 9. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is no easy solution to combat the problems of municipal financial 
distress. If federal bankruptcy is to remain an option for doing so, however, it is in 
need of reform. Over twenty years ago, a call went out to reform the municipal 
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bankruptcy system—a call that, by and large, has been ignored.315 By analyzing a 
series of recent Chapter 9 filings, this Article has provided concrete evidence of the 
need for reform and has identified primary concerns to address in thinking about the 
next phase of municipal bankruptcy. Studying the cities and towns that are going 
through or have emerged from Chapter 9 provides important insights and critical 
examples of Chapter 9’s shortcomings. A close examination of these cities’ journeys 
through bankruptcy illustrates how and why Chapter 9, in its current incarnation, 
fails to function as an ideal bankruptcy relief mechanism. 
By studying the difficulties municipalities have encountered in utilizing 
Chapter 9, policymakers can make more informed decisions about the future of 
bankruptcy law more generally. By identifying Chapter 9’s functional shortcomings, 
this Article should help policymakers think through whether and how bankruptcy 
law should be applied to new areas. For example, the work assimilated in this Article 
should be useful in evaluating recent proposals to utilize bankruptcy to address the 
difficulties encountered by states,316 territories,317 and large financial institutions.318 
This Article lays the groundwork for future examination into comprehensive 
reform of Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Studying what has gone wrong with municipal 
bankruptcies over the years allows for a more accurate evaluation of proposed 
solutions to combating the problem of municipal financial distress. This Article’s 
examination of how Chapter 9 has fallen short of helping cities out of their distress 
clearly indicates that it is time to formulate more appropriate mechanisms to bolster 
Chapter 9 relief for struggling cities and towns. 
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